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Abstract
In the current public discussion, it is considered certain that we are living in a time 
of rapidly advancing automation, which is driven in particular by the use of robots. 
Accordingly, many academic publications use robot density as the central indicator 
of automation. The present study challenges this perspective. It examines two central 
questions: First, what approaches to automation and digitalization have been pursued 
in the automotive industry in Germany, Japan and the USA? Second, how have emp-
loyment and its occupational composition in the automotive industry developed in the 
three countries? The first part of the study focuses on the development of automation 
and digitalization approaches in the automotive industry from the early 1990s until to-
day. It combines a qualitative analysis of press articles and a quantitative evaluation of 
the development of the stock of industrial robots from 1993 to 2018 based on the sta-
tistics of the International Federation of Robotics. The second part of the study focuses 
on the change in employment structures using occupational statistics from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (USA), the Federal Employment Agency (Germany) and the Sta-
tistics Bureau of Japan. The study questions the perception of an automation-related 
threat to employment and especially to production employment. At the same time, it 
discusses developments in Germany, Japan and the USA in comparison and highlights 
differences in automation and digitalization approaches as well as different paths of 
change in employment structures.
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1. Introduction
Current analyses of technological change take it for granted that we are living in a time 
of rapidly increasing automation, which will particularly affect employees working in 
routine jobs. In such debates, production has been invoked as an example of a sector 
dominated by routine work. An influential study by Frey and Osborne (2013) predicted 
a probability of automation of 98% for assembly workers, 94% for welders, and over 
90% for different types of machine operators - all typical occupations in the automo-
tive industry. However, the current discussion has been dominated by abstract argu-
ments about automation potential (Frey/Osborne 2013; Dengler/Matthes 2018), while 
detailed analyses of technological development and its effects on work have been rare 
(see as an exception Jürgens 2020).
The present study attempts to provide a realistic assessment of the development of 
process technologies and the changes in employment structures in the automotive sec-
tor. It builds on a research tradition at the WZB that emphasizes the interdependen-
cies between technologies, production systems, employment structures, and personnel 
strategies (Jürgens et al. 1993; Jürgens 1997; Jürgens & Krzywdzinski 2016). It aims 
at a historical reconstruction of the development of automation and digitalization ap-
proaches in the automotive industry in order to arrive at an empirically based unders-
tanding of their motivations, forms and results. An international comparative approach 
will be followed in order to determine the spectrum of developments. The focus is 
on three central automobile manufacturing countries: Germany, Japan and the United 
States. The two main questions are1:
• What approaches to automation and digitalization are being pursued in the auto-
motive industry in Germany, the United States, and Japan?
• How have employment and its occupational composition in the automotive indus-
try developed in these three countries?
The study aims to correct three perceptions that are dominating the current public and 
academic discussions but are at least partially false. Firstly, it questions the perception 
that we are living in a phase of rapidly increasing automation, understood as the subs-
titution of human labor by machines or computers. It uses qualitative and quantitative 
data to analyze the development of automation and digitalization approaches in the 
automotive industry from the early 1990s until today. The qualitative analysis is based 
on a total of 439 articles from automotive industry print outlets. The study also uses 
1 I would like to thank Ulrich Jürgens, Martin Kuhlmann and Florian Butollo, who read, commented 
and discussed with me the first version of this paper.
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the figures provided by the International Federation of Robotics on the development of 
robot installations from 1993 to the present as a quantitative indicator.
Second, the study challenges the current focus in academic and public discussions 
on robots as the primary form of automation. Robot density (meaning the number of 
robots in relation to the number of employees) has become a tremendously popular 
indicator in research and is now used to explain phenomena as diverse as employ-
ment, pay inequalities between groups of employees, or international trade flows (e.g. 
Acemoglu/Restrepo 2017; Graetz/Michaels 2018; Aksoy et al. 2019; Carbonero et al. 
2020). The assumption of these studies is that the number of robots is a useful indicator 
of automation or even of technological change in general – an assumption which to 
the author’s knowledge has not been adequately tested and deserve to be questioned.
Third, the study questions perceptions of an automation-related decline in employment 
and in particular in production employment. These perceptions have so far been based 
on abstract calculations of substitution potential and not on empirical analyses. This 
study focuses on the structure of employment by occupations. The analysis of emp-
loyment structures in the present study is based on occupational statistics provided by 
the Federal Employment Agency (Germany), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (United 
States), and the Statistics Bureau of Japan.
2. Back to the Future: Automation 
and Digitalization
Automation, which has become a central social issue in the current discussion about 
Industry 4.0 and digitalization, refers to a specific form of technology. Schulz-Schaef-
fer (2008: 1) has argued that we can understand technology as “artificially generated 
causal relationships” that produce “sufficiently reliably [...] certain desired effects.” 
Technology can materialize in particular forms, for instance as a machine, but it can 
also manifest as a procedure or an algorithm. The term automation refers to a technolo-
gy that can perform certain tasks without human intervention (Nof 2009). Automation 
thus applies to mechanical devices, electronically controlled machines and robots, and 
software systems that automatically process data. Advances in automation represent 
only one form of technological change—technological change also involves the de-
velopment of entirely new techniques, materials, products, and product architectures, 
which in human history have often been more disruptive to business, work, and emp-
loyment than automation (Christensen 1997).
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The current public and academic debates on the development of automation and its 
effects on employment have been strongly influenced by econometric studies that, 
in essence, adopted a technological-deterministic perspective (see Hirsch-Kreinsen 
2018). Two key assumptions are worth noting. First, these econometric studies assu-
med a linear progression of automation, from “less automation” to “more automation.” 
Second, they assumed a clear correlation between automation and employment struc-
tures. In contrast, sociological research has pointed out that, with regard to automation 
approaches, it is important to account for (a) the material and technical conditions, (b) 
the companies’ motives, and (c) the companies’ organizational and work models.
The material-technical conditions primarily relate to the complexity of the product 
and its production, that is to the variety of parts and machining processes, the va-
riability of the production environment, the production volumes, and the production 
speed (Baethge-Kinsky et al. 2018). The greater the complexity, the more difficult it 
is to automate the production process. For this reason, there are fundamental diffe-
rences in automation levels in the automotive industry depending on the process in 
question. Mechanical processing, pressing, welding, and painting processes are highly 
automated (see Jürgens 2020; Kern/Schumann 1984). Automobile assembly, on the 
other hand, is a complex process with a large number of distinct work steps and many 
different variants; this area is consequently much less automated (Fujimoto 2017). The 
following empirical analysis will consider the material-technical conditions by compa-
ring developments in assembly and car body construction.
With regard to the motives for automation, the economic literature emphasizes the 
role of costs (for example, by comparing the relative costs of equipment to those of 
labor) (cf. Acemoglu/Restrepo 2018, which is just one example of many). Cost con-
siderations certainly play an important role, but they are by no means the only motive 
for automation. Empirical analyses show that automation is often introduced either 
because certain processing steps cannot be performed by humans at all, or because 
humans cannot do so with the required precision and quality (Krzywdzinski 2016). 
Desired improvements in ergonomics may also be a motive for automation, for exam-
ple, when certain jobs cause great stress and damage to employees’ health. One key 
point highlighted in analyses of the motives for automation is that there is no clear one 
best way; different approaches and strategies are possible (see e.g. Jürgens et al. 1993; 
Adler 1988; Fujimoto 1992 and 1997; Freyssenet 1999).
Decisions about the use of technology are made against the backdrop of specific pro-
ducts, production systems, and corporate strategies, but also specific education systems 
and industrial relations (Noble 1979; MacKenzie/Wajcman 1985; Wajcman 2006). Re-
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search on automation approaches in the 1980s and 1990s showed that Japanese automo-
bile manufacturers’ production systems were strongly guided by the goal of flexibility 
in the sense of being able to rapidly adapt the product mix and production volumes to 
market demand. Japanese companies only saw cost-reduction potential in automation 
technologies if the desired flexibility could be guaranteed (Jürgens et al. 1993; Adler 
1988; Fujimoto 1992; MacDuffie/Pil 1997; Daito 2015). This implied a preference for 
simpler and more robust solutions and, in borderline cases, the abandonment of auto-
mation. In contrast to the Japanese companies, European companies—especially VW 
and Fiat—saw “high-tech” automation as a prerequisite for high quality and produc-
tivity; flexible adaptation of production was considered less important (at least in the 
1980s). Until the 1980s, American companies (especially General Motors) had also 
focused on high-tech automation, but had experienced a fiasco (Ingrassia/White 1994). 
Since the end of the 1980s there has been a growing perception in the USA that high-
tech automation was too rigid and error-prone (Adler 1988; Jürgens et al. 1988).
The 1990s saw two major developments. The first was the “Japan shock,” triggered 
by the success of Japanese companies in the USA and later in Europe and by a series 
of studies that demonstrated the superiority of Japanese production concepts; the best-
known study is Womack et al. (1991) on lean production (see also Krafcik 1988). Lean 
production integrated essential elements of Japanese production concepts and reduced 
European automobile companies’ focus on high-tech automation (see Liker 2004 on 
the automation-skeptic perspective of lean production). The second development was 
the emergence of labor shortages and conflicts in Japan and Europe, which led to 
greater consideration of ergonomics and also prompted an improvement in the quality 
of work (see Fujimoto 1997; Niimi/Matsudaira 1997; Sandberg 1994; Jürgens 1995; 
Berggren 1997; Krzywdzinski 2020). Unfortunately, there have been no analyses of 
this kind comparing Germany, the United States, and Japan since the end of the 1990s, 
especially no longitudinal studies of companies.
Finally, with regard to the effects of the various automation approaches on work, we 
have to consider labor and organizational models (cf. Schumann et al. 1994; Baeth-
ge-Kinsky et al. 2018), which can vary greatly between companies (Jürgens et al. 
1993; Liker et al. 1999; Krzywdzinski 2017). In the German automotive industry, the 
focus on high-tech automation in the 1980s and 1990s was accompanied by a labor 
model focused on professionalization and skilled work (Kern/Schumann 1984; Jür-
gens et al. 1993; Kuhlmann 2004; Krzywdzinski 2020). This was especially evident 
in highly automated areas such as car body construction; by contrast, manual areas 
such as assembly continued to be characterized by high proportions of semi-skilled 
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workers (although at least car manufacturers were recruiting more and more workers 
with skilled-worker training in assembly as well; cf. Jürgens 2012). This situation has 
persisted to this day (Baethge-Kinsky et al. 2018). In Japan, companies’ automation 
approaches, which emphasized flexibility, were also accompanied by labor models 
that strongly emphasized skill and personnel development, including for production 
workers. However, this involved offering internal company development paths rather 
than formal vocational training (Krzywdzinski/Jürgens 2019; Jürgens/Krzywdzinski 
2016; Jürgens 2012). In the American case, by contrast, studies from the 1980s and 
1990s reported a continued preoccupation with Taylorist forms of work organization, 
tight job demarcations, and very limited investment in training (Jürgens et al. 1993; 
Adler/Cole 1993). This development has continued into the 2000s (Rothstein 2016).
It should be noted here that the hoped-for effects of automation (or of technological 
change in general) often do not materialize until they are accompanied by changes in 
organizational structures (see the contributions in Jürgens 1997). It is therefore diffi-
cult to disentangle the effects of technology and organization. One important result of 
the discussion on lean production was that process organization came to have a central 
influence on productivity (Womack et al. 1990). Although the introduction of lean 
production was also accompanied by technical innovations, these innovations were of 
greatest importance as a form of support for organizational changes, the prerequisite 
for meaningful automation was the lean design of processes (Butollo et al. 2018; Ad-
ler/Cole 1993). The classic study by Womack et al (1990) even emphasized that the 
most efficient plants were characterized by the lowest levels of automation.
Analyzing automation approaches is just as complex as analyzing the digitalization 
of work processes. The term digitalization generally refers to the conversion of ana-
log information into a digital format. When applied to the world of work, it can be 
understood as the establishment of networks between machines as well as the use of 
software systems and digital databases for monitoring, controlling, and optimizing 
work processes (Hirsch-Kreinsen/ten Hompel 2015). In this sense, digitalization only 
partially overlaps with automation. In some cases, it may well mean automation when 
certain calculations that were previously done by humans are now automatically done 
by the software. The virtual prototypes created by CAD systems are one example of 
this; these can be used to automatically run simulations regarding noise or the strength 
of physical structures—simulations which would previously have required real tests 
on physical prototypes. In other cases, however, digitalization also means the crea-
tion of entirely new possibilities that were not available in the past—in other words, 
digitalization cannot be equated with automation. In the case of the virtual prototypes 
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mentioned above, for example, design options can be tried out and inspected extreme-
ly quickly.
The complexity of the relationship between digitalization and automation is due to the 
complexity of the knowledge work that digitalization concerns itself with. This is evi-
dent in the discussion on Industry 4.0 (Acatech/Forschungsunion 2013; Spath 2013). 
As Butollo et al (2018) has pointed out, Industry 4.0 does not describe a coherent 
production model but rather a bundle of very different technical developments. The 
networking of production equipment and the intensification of the collection, analysis, 
and use of process data to monitor and optimize work and production processes play a 
central role here. Even though the public discussion has largely focused on the topic of 
“robots” and thus on the potential automation of manual work, even a brief look at In-
dustry 4.0 reveals that it has more to do with monitoring and maintenance activities in 
production processes and with planning, optimization, and development activities—in 
other words,  knowledge work.
Knowledge work combines processes of knowledge acquisition, knowledge objec-
tification, and knowledge re-transmission (Malsch 1987). In knowledge acquisition, 
both standardized—i.e. algorithmically representable—procedures and experience are 
used; knowledge objectification means the systematization of knowledge by defining 
rules, concepts, etc. Knowledge retransfer means the translation of objectified know-
ledge into application knowledge. Knowledge work implies a constant back and forth 
between, on the one hand, objectified procedures and, on the other hand, experien-
ce-led and creative activities. A number of studies have argued that it is precisely those 
knowledge components that cannot be objectified and that are based on experience and 
interaction that are becoming increasingly important (cf. Rammert 1999; Wilkesmann 
2005). Digitalization can refer to the automation of the algorithmically representable 
elements of knowledge work; yet, with regard to creative activities, it is primarily a 
form of technical support.
In research on Industry 4.0, there is now a heated debate on the extent to which a 
push towards the objectification of knowledge and, accordingly, a change in skill re-
quirements and work contents is taking place (see Acatech 2015; Günther et al. 2015; 
Boes/Kämpf 2016; Butollo et al. 2018). Most studies see little danger of automation: 
Even the aforementioned Frey-and-Osborne study (2013) estimates a probability of 
automation of jobs for engineers, computer scientists and software developers in low 
single-digit percentages. These arguments are part of a long-standing discussion that 
also goes back at least to the 1980s and 1990s. Even then, although individual studies 
identified a danger of automating engineering work (Shaiken 1984), most analyses 
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questioned these dangers (Giordano 1992; McLoughlin 1989 and 1990; Salzmann 
1989). So far, however, we have lacked long-term and comparative in-depth analyses 
of companies that could tie in with the discussions of the 1980s and 1990s.
In view of the lack of empirical material, the present study takes a new approach and 
seeks to build a bridge between the discussions of the 1980s and 1990s and today’s 
debate on digitalization and automation. In the absence of company-related data and 
analyses, the study draws on industry-level sources and attempts to examine coun-
try-specific developments in the automotive sector as a whole. However, due to the 
focus on the sector as a whole and the limited data available, the sociological argument 
about the close connection between technical and organizational innovations can only 
be addressed indirectly. In particular, the data sources used here lack information on 
the changes in organizational structures and work organization. The study therefore 
only indirectly addresses changes in the area of work organization by analyzing occu-
pational structures.
3. Data
The study combines data from four statistical sources and supplements these with an 
analysis of the automobile and automation industry press.
3.1. Automation and Digitalization Approaches
This analysis of the automation and digitalization approaches combines a qualitative 
and a quantitative approach. In a first step, a qualitative analysis of press articles was 
used to reconstruct developments. The focus was on three overarching areas: assemb-
ly, car body construction, and the indirect areas (product development, planning, and 
production control). One of the key sources for this study was the German-language 
industry journal Automobil Produktion, which reports monthly on developments in the 
automotive industry. A particular advantage of Automobil Produktion is that it not only 
covers news about market and product developments, but also about technical and or-
ganizational developments in production as well as in product development, planning, 
quality assurance, and other areas. Automobil Produktion reports on the global auto-
motive industry but focuses on Germany and Europe. The study analyzed a total of 
393 articles from Automobil Produktion. To capture the development of the American 
and Japanese automotive industries, 46 articles from Automation World, Automotive 
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Manufacturing Solutions, and other publications were also included. The procedure is 
described in more detail in the Appendix. The sources are cited in the analysis with the 
following abbreviations: AP (Automobil Produktion), AW (Automation World), and 
AMS (Automotive Manufacturing Solutions).
Note that a press article analysis does not allow for a systematic longitudinal analysis 
of a company (or group of companies) and cannot replace case-study-based approaches 
(see Jürgens 2020). Rather, the articles in the press are used to characterize the develop-
ment of automation approaches for the entire automotive industry in the countries stu-
died—of course, this does not capture the many differences between the companies.
In the second step, the automation approaches were examined using a quantitative 
indicator, namely the stock of industrial robots in the automotive industry. The statis-
tical source is the database of the International Federation of Robotics (IFR), which 
contains information on Germany, the United States, and Japan. More detailed infor-
mation is also provided in the Appendix.
3.2. Employment Structures
In this study, an analysis of automation and digitalization approaches is combined with 
an analysis of changes in employment structures. The analysis reconstructs the trends 
in different occupations in the blue-collar and white-collar areas (e.g., engineers and 
computer scientists). The aim is to obtain a precise picture of the development patterns.
The absolute employment figures are based on data collected by the German Associa-
tion of the Automobile Industry (VDA) in its yearly publications on international auto 
statistics. In addition, the study draws on occupational statistics for the automotive 
industry from the USA, Germany, and Japan.
For the USA, the study uses data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) 
program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The OES program collects data on 
employment, occupations, and wage levels for employees in the U.S. economy every 
six months. About 180,000 to 200,000 companies are surveyed on each occasion. The 
BLS extrapolates the data to calculate total employment. Since the surveyed compa-
nies change (it is not a panel study), changes between years should be treated with a 
certain amount of caution. No annual occupational statistics are available for Japan. 
The best source is the Population Census, which is conducted every five years by the 
Statistics Bureau of Japan (SBJ) and covers the entire population. The data for the Ger-
man automotive industry are from the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit, BA). The Federal Employment Agency compiles annual employment sta-
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tistics based on employers’ social insurance reports. These notifications are submitted 
to the Federal Employment Agency via the health and pension insurance agencies and 
cover all employees.
During the period studied, there were a number of changes in the classification systems 
underlying the statistics used here. These are highlighted in the following analysis, as 
they limit the comparability of the data over time. A detailed explanation of the classi-
fication systems (and also of the abbreviations used for them in the presentation) and 
their changes over time can be found in the Appendix.
4. Historical Development of 
Automation and Digitalization 
Approaches
At the end of the 1980s, a kind of automation euphoria still prevailed in the automotive 
industry. It was well-founded, as the industry had achieved considerable successes in 
automation in its long history. The mechanical processing of metal parts had been auto-
mated by the introduction of single-purpose machines at Ford in the 1920s, the develop-
ment of NC machines in the 1940s, and CNC machines in the 1970s (Jürgens 2020; 
Hsieh et al. 1997; Noble 1979). In the 1970s and 1980s, the introduction of welding jigs 
and welding robots largely automated car body construction, at least in the pioneering 
plants of the automotive industry (cf. Milkman/Pullman 1991; Kern/Schumann 1984; 
Jürgens et al. 1993). In the 1980s, large presses and press lines became more widespread 
in the press shops, and these also greatly reduced the proportion of manual work there. 
Assembly processes were the last bastions of manual work, but in the 1980s, there were 
also attempts to increase automation here (Heßler 2014; Fraunhofer IPA 1988).
In Germany, Daimler and Volkswagen—in particular Hall 54 of the Wolfsburg plant—
were regarded as pioneers (Heßler 2014; Fraunhofer IPA 1988). But Japanese compa-
nies were also advancing automation (cf. Coffey/Thornley 2006). In 1993, the journal 
Automobil Produktion reported on three automobile plants in a series of articles: To-
yota Tahara, Mazda Hofu, and Nissan Kyushu.2 All three plants had almost completely 
automated body shops, i.e., both welding and material handling were largely done by 
robots. A particular source of pride for the Japanese plants was the flexibility of the 
2 AP April/June/August 1993
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automation: Rotating clamping devices enabled the companies to produce several mo-
dels on one body line. The transport of subassemblies in the body shop was handled 
by automated guided vehicles (AGVs). Even in assembly process automation levels 
ranged between 15% (Toyota3) and 20% (Nissan4).
At the beginning of the 1990s, however, strategies were reoriented. The cooling of the 
economy revealed the weakness of the highly automated plants: overcapacity and an 
inability to depress fixed costs. Lean production emerged as a new management con-
cept that focused on organizational restructuring rather than automation.
4.1. Changing Approaches to Automation and 
Digitalization – Analysis of the Industry Press
The reorientation of the companies’ automation approaches began in 1993 and 1994, 
but they took  different paths depending on the production process. In the following, 
three areas are analyzed: the assembly shop, the body shop (an area that was already 
highly automated in the 1980s), and selected indirect areas (product development, 
process planning, production control).
Automation Approaches in Assembly
In the assembly areas, the move away from earlier automation strategies was most 
pronounced. In the 1990s, a reorganization of the assembly areas was undertaken to 
implement a clear flow orientation5 and the just-in-time principle. This was supple-
mented by the modularization of processes and the outsourcing of modules (e.g., en-
gine, doors, cockpit, etc.) to closed pre-assembly areas (for more on modularization, 
see Salerno 2001; Ro et al. 2007; MacDuffie 2013).
However, differences between German, Japanese, and American companies became ap-
parent. In Japanese companies, assembly automation was reduced, and the new Toyota 
plant in Kyushu was designed with very limited automation in mind.6 Even if not all 
Japanese companies turned away from the idea of assembly automation as strongly as 
3 AP June 1993
4 AP August 1993. Robots were used at Nissan to install the rear lights, front and rear windows, 
seats, batteries, wheels and spare wheels, rubber seals on the doors, bumpers, and engines.
5 According to the flow principle, production is divided into interlinked and synchronized sequences 
of work steps. The products move evenly in this chain, so that all work stations are used to capaci-
ty.
6 AP September 1994
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Toyota did (see Cusumano 1985 for more on Nissan), the 1990s were characterized by 
a skeptical attitude towards assembly automation in the Japanese automotive industry.
Just like the Japanese companies, American companies also turned away from assembly 
automation in the 1990s. The new vehicle ramp-ups at the Ford and GM plants from the 
mid-1990s onwards were accompanied by a reduction in automation in the assembly areas. 
Companies still used automated processes for the “marriage” (the merging of the car body 
with the drive train) and gluing of windows, but further automation steps were mostly 
omitted.7 The Production Director of Ford Europe formulated the strategy as follows:
“One of our special features is that we use very little automation in final as-
sembly. This will not change in the future. The experience of Far Eastern ma-
nufacturers who dismantled existing automation a few years ago served as a 
model, because automation in final assembly not only hinders a continuous and 
maximum increase in productivity, but sometimes even makes it completely 
impossible.” (AP December 2000, p. 32)
However, German companies, especially Volkswagen, did not fully move away from 
automation in assembly. The modernization of the Daimler plant in Rastatt for the 
launch of the new A-Class in 1997 was accompanied by an expansion of assembly 
automation, which was also motivated by ergonomic objectives.8 Assembly automa-
tion rates also increased from 30% to 33% in the ramp-up of the new Golf A4 at the 
VW plant in Wolfsburg in 1997.9
In the 2000s, there was hardly any change with regard to the automation of assembly 
in German automotive plants10, but in other areas—such as the engine plants—more 
automation was also introduced.11 Daimler, in particular, sought to introduce further 
automation in assembly. In 2009, the “Assembly 21” concept, which promised increa-
sed automation, was presented. An example of this was its rear axle assembly, which 
Daimler converted from a manual process supported by two robots to a highly auto-
7 AP February 1995 and August 1995
8 AP Special Edition A Class 1997; see also AP Special Edition S Class 1998. The rear door, the 
seats, the pedal module, the wheels, the slatted roof, the door seals, the windows, the canopy, the 
battery, and spare wheel well were mounted automatically; the “marriage” was automated, too.
9 AP Special Edition Golf A4 1997. The entire chassis assembly (subframe, steering gear, wishbone, 
stabilizer, engine, front axle), the “marriage”, and the installation of the battery, wheels, buffer 
rod and front end were automated. In addition, many bolting processes were partially automated. 
However, the influence of the move away from assembly automation, led by Japanese and Amer-
ican companies, was making itself felt in German companies’ oversea plants. The new Daimler 
plant in Tuscaloosa largely dispensed with assembly automation (AP October 1997); in the case 
of Volkswagen the modernized Seat plant in Martorell, Spain was considered a model of a new 
strategy that made hardly any use of automation in assembly; the plants in Bratislava and Pamplo-
na followed this pattern (AP June 2001; AP February 2002).
10 AP December 2005
11 AP July 2010
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mated concept with 45 robots; in the process, the number of assembly workers was 
halved.12 In this case, automation was based on a separation of the automatable and 
manual work steps and the optimization of the material feed. Short-cycle route trains 
supplied the station from central storage to create space for the robots.
The discussion about assembly automation received new impetus in the 2010s, when 
the first lightweight robots came onto the market. Lightweight robots resemble human 
arms and can be used relatively flexibly in assembly work. Nevertheless, there are 
major limitations, because lightweight robots are still very slow and can only work in 
a very standardized and rigid environment.13 Nevertheless, in the 2010s, German auto-
motive companies began trying out lightweight robots at simple assembly worksta-
tions, for example, when assembling transmission components (Daimler14) or gluing 
sound insulation to doors (BMW).15 In the mid-2010s, AGVs also made a comeback in 
the intralogistics of production sites in the automotive industry.16
The development of the Volkswagen plant in Zwickau, where production of the new 
ID.3 electric car started in 2019, shows that assembly automation remains on German 
automotive companies’ agenda. Volkswagen has presented Zwickau as the model plant 
for the production of its electric vehicles and is explicitly emphasizing the automation 
of assembly (Volkswagen 2020): The degree of assembly automation in Zwickau has 
been increased from 12% to 30%.17 The increasing automation is also linked to chan-
ges in product architecture: The drivetrain of electric vehicles is much simpler than 
that of cars with combustion engines, which significantly reduces the number and 
complexity of assembly steps in the engine compartment and drivetrain. Although 
Volkswagen itself has emphasized the goal of increasing assembly automation,18 note 
that the automation level reached in Zwickau is comparable to the one achieved in the 
VW plant in Wolfsburg in the 1990s.
The differences between developments in Germany and Japan can be exemplified 
using the contrast between current developments at Volkswagen and Toyota. The cen-
tral aim underlying the organization of assembly processes at Toyota is cost reduction 
12 AP January 2009; vgl. AP June 2013
13 AP June 2019
14 AP November 2015
15 AP October 2015
16 AP April 2014, September 2015, April 2017; AMS April 2016
17 In addition to the “marriage,” the automated assembly process includes attaching the door seal, 
placing the glass roof, installing the rear and front axles, fitting the cockpit, bolting the chassis, ad-
justing the headlights, fine-tuning the chassis, and undertaking quality control of the gap and flush 
of the doors (Volkswagen 2020).
18 AP September 2018
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and flexibility. This means a limitation of or sometimes even a reduction in automa-
tion. The above-described dismantling of assembly automation in the 1990s continued 
in the 2000s. In the 2010s, Toyota’s assembly areas reported automation levels of less 
than 10% (Rothfelder 2017). The Takaoka plant represents the most recent develop-
ment in this area (see Schmitt 2019).19 The plant has two assembly shops. Takaoka 1 is 
probably not very different from the assembly lines in Germany, yet it certainly is less 
automated. Takaoka 2 is not automated at all. The vehicles move through the assembly 
area on AGVs; there is no assembly line. Since the stations do not require any auto-
mation, they can be converted within a very short time. Takaoka 1 has an optimum cost 
level at 200,000 vehicles per year. If production increases beyond this level, Takaoka 
2 takes over, as the capacities can be flexibly increased and decreased.20
The American “Big Three” (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) also remain skepti-
cal about automating assembly processes, although, like the German manufacturers, 
they are experimenting with the use of lightweight robots and other automation tech-
niques.21 At its Orion plant, for example, GM uses six lightweight robots to glue the 
headliner, insert spare tires, adjust lights, and test sensors. However, the level of auto-
mation in assembly remains very low for most of the new product ramp-ups in the 
company’s plants.22
In principle, it can therefore be said that German companies in the automotive industry 
did not turn away from the idea of assembly automation to the same extent as occurred 
in Japan and the USA. At the same time, the progress made in assembly automation 
over the last 30 years has been relatively small, meaning that today’s automotive plants 
only differ from their predecessors in terms of assembly automation at individual sta-
tions.23 Incidentally, Tesla recently attempted a major advance in assembly automa-
19 See also AMS August 2017 on the Motomachi plant
20 A certain similarity to the Takaoka concept is evident in projects by German car manufacturers 
that aim at making assembly processes more flexible. However, technology plays a greater role 
in Germany. Audi, for instance, is working on modular assembly concepts that deviate from the 
strict principle of the assembly line. As in Takaoka, these systems are based on AGVs. At Audi, 
however, the evidence is not in the ease with which the assembly areas can be converted but in the 
“smart” control of the AGVs and thus the flow of materials. Audi has been using AGVs to trans-
port the bodies of the R8 in Neckersulm since 2015. In the process, certain derivatives automati-
cally stop at special stations (e.g., fabric roof assembly) that most car bodies in production do not 
stop at. In this way, automatic flexibility is built into the assembly system. At present, this flexibili-
ty is limited to a few optional extras, but Audi sees “modular assembly” in Neckersulm as a model 
project for the future (AP September 2017). However, this approach does not mean a decentralized 
system. Rather, a central algorithm based on incoming orders calculates the most efficient utiliza-
tion of the assembly stations and logistics chains and precisely determines the order sequence six 
days in advance (AP April 2018).
21 AW April 2018; AMS May 2019
22 AMS September 2015
23 AP July 2018.
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tion—the grandiose failure of this experiment was described in an article in the New 
York Times (Boudette 2018).
Finally, it should be noted that since the 1990s, automated support and control systems 
have become widespread in automotive plants, regardless of the company’s country of 
origin. The ergonomics of the assembly processes have been improved by the intro-
duction of more and more lifting aids, parts trolleys that move along the assembly line 
and other aids. Additionally, assistance systems have been introduced to support the 
work processes. This began in the mid-1990s, with the increasing use of screwdrivers 
with automatic control of torque and angle of rotation, which minimized faulty screw 
connections.24 From the mid-1990s onwards, Audi, BMW, and other companies started 
installing information boards at assembly workstations that display information about 
the parts and special features required in each case based on an identification num-
ber read from the vehicle; this assists the workers.25 In the 2000s, companies such as 
Audi and Daimler began installing laser sensors that control the size of the joints and 
the positioning of the module in lifting aids for installing heavy modules such as the 
cockpit.26 Since the 2010s, companies have experimented with the use of data glasses, 
smart watches, and other devices to provide information to workers completing assem-
bly and logistics processes (Evers et al. 2019).
Automation Approaches in the Body Shop
In contrast to the assembly areas, the body shops were already highly automated at the 
beginning of the 1990s and there was no turning back from automation here. Even in 
the Toyota plant in Kyushu—which largely abandoned assembly-shop automation—
body-shop automation levels differed little from those in highly automated plants such 
as Toyota Tahara.27 In the 1990s, automation levels of 90% to 100% were achieved in 
the body shops at most European, American, and Japanese factories.
As Figure 1 shows, the trends until the 2010s cannot be characterized as moving to-
wards “more” automation—automation levels have remained largely constant. The 
figure shows the levels of body shop automation reported in German automotive plants 
in the journal Automobil Produktion. Automation levels of 90–100% have been achie-
ved since the 1990s. Incidentally, these levels have become so commonplace in indus-
24 AP February 1993, February 1994
25 AP April 1993
26 AP Special Edition Audi A4 2001, AP February 2005
27 AP September 1994
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trialized high-wage countries that the magazine’s factory portraits stopped quantifying 
the level of automation from around 2010 onwards.
Figure 1: Body shop automation levels of selected automobile plants
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Source: Automobil Produktion, volumes 1992–2019. The figure shows all plants for which information 
about automation levels was available. 
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It should be noted here that although body-shop automation has reduced direct manual 
work on the product, humans still carry out the monitoring and maintenance work. 
This work has even gained in importance (Kuhlmann 2004). Manual welding has thus 
disappeared from the factories but human labor has not.
Since the 1990s, the change in technology in the body shops has been driven by seve-
ral factors. First, the focus on lean production led to a reorganization of processes and 
an optimization of material flows. A dominant approach here was the organization of 
the body shop according to the herringbone layout28: the main line on which the bodies 
are welded is in the center; the welding lines for the subassemblies (side panels, roof, 
doors, etc.) are arranged like herringbones so that they lead to the main line and the 
subassembly task in question is completed at the right place next to the main line. The 
side lines are connected to the main line by roller conveyors, from which the robots 
can grip directly. In this way, transport distances and the need for manual insertion 
activities have been minimized. This has also made it possible to phase out the expen-
sive and failure-prone AGVs, most of which disappeared again from the automobile 
factories from the mid-1990s onwards.29
28 AP Special Edition A Class 1997, Special Edition Golf A4 1997, AP Special Edition Opel Bochum 
1998, AP June 1998, AP January 2000
29 AP February 2002
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Second, since the 1990s, the variety of joining techniques in car body construction has 
increased continuously, that is, the major challenge for the companies was to achieve 
mastery in increasingly complex automation. This was driven by several developments:
• There was a growing need to reduce vehicle weight (to lower fuel consumption), 
which led to an increased use of aluminum and plastics (including carbon) along-
side the usual steel in the bodywork.30 It is much more difficult to weld aluminum 
than steel because the material reacts much more to heat. This has led to a further 
development of laser technology, but also to an increased use of gluing techniques 
that do not generate heat.31 The increasing use of plastic parts has also resulted in 
an increased use of gluing in car body construction.
• The requirements for vehicle safety, body strength, and thus the quality of the 
joining processes have increased. Since the 1990s, the use of laser welding has 
therefore become more and more widespread in automotive plants,32 with Ger-
man manufacturers being at the forefront of introducing this technologies in mass 
production (Jürgens/Meißner 2005).33 In addition, since the mid-2000s, the use 
of multi-robot cells in car body construction has increased, which is placing new 
demands on programming.34 In these cells, several robots work together: one grips 
a part, while others process this part or check the quality.
• Since the 1990s, quality requirements have led to an increasing use of inline mea-
suring devices and geometry stations, since any deviation, even one in the millime-
ter range, can affect the rigidity of the bodywork and the fit of parts. In the 2010s, 
production lines in car body construction were already equipped with devices that 
could register several hundred to several thousand measuring points and provide 
data on the quality of the welding process.
Third, a particular challenge has been to reconcile automation and flexibility, especi-
ally in view of the continuing increase in model variants. Some companies—such as 
Daimler and Volkswagen—began restricting the flexibility of body shop lines from 
the 1990s onwards, with each line producing one model family only.35 The price of 
particular advanced technology was to limit flexibility. Other companies continued 
to seek flexibility, which required the development of complex clamping devices that 
could flexibly accommodate components of different sizes and with different gripping 
30 AP May 2017
31 AP May 2010; AP June 2011
32 AP April 1992, April 1998
33 AP October 1992, December 1996, AP April 2008, AP June 2013
34 AP April 2006
35 AP Special Edition S Class 1998
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points.36 Japanese companies were particularly successful in making car body cons-
truction processes more flexible. The successes were not the result of a sophisticated 
digitalization strategy (or even artificial intelligence), but were the product of well-
thought-out product architectures with regard to their “manufacturability” (Fujimoto 
1997; Adler et al. 1999). A prime example is the New Global Body Line introduced 
by Toyota in the early 2000s (cf. Brown 2004). As early as the 1990s, several vehicle 
models could be produced on Toyota’s body shop lines; the flexibility was based on a 
sophisticated system of gripping tools and pallets used to grip and position the parts 
of the car bodies to be welded. However, changing the gripping tools took time and 
their storage required a lot of space. The central innovation of the New Global Body 
Line was the introduction of a universal gripping tool, which was moved from above 
the car into the interior of the car body and was used to fix the parts in place during the 
welding process. By standardizing the gripping points over a large number of vehicle 
models, the company could produce up to eight models on one welding line with the 
same tool. Toyota has estimated the savings in production equipment costs to be 50% 
and in the ramp-up costs of new models to be 70% because the equipment hardly had 
to be changed (Brown 2004).
Thus, the development of manufacturing techniques in the body shop since the 1990s 
has been characterized less by an increase in automation—car body manufacturing in 
all plants of German, American and Japanese manufacturers has been largely automa-
ted for some time—than by an incremental increase in complexity. Progress in pro-
ductivity is very much based on innovations in product architecture (this is also the 
conclusion of the study by Jürgens 2020, which is based on a longitudinal analysis at 
company level).37
36 AP October 2007; AW June 2004 and December 2013
37 Potentially disruptive approaches are still a long way from being actually feasible. For example, 
robot manufacturer KUKA is working on a modular concept for car body manufacturing that 
moves away from the herringbone principle and the rigid interlinking of stations (AP Septem-
ber 2016). The idea is to create a modular structure of flexible robot stations that can be flexibly 
approached by AGVs with the car body parts to be processed (Kuka 2016). However, the concept 
is still far from being implemented in practice. The use of 3D printing could also be disruptive, 
as it would completely replace the joining processes commonly used today. Since the middle of 
the 2010s, 3D printing has become established in the automotive industry in Germany, the United 
States, and Japan in the field of prototype construction (AW November 2013). Individual manufac-
turers such as BMW are also already building in individual small series of a few hundred to a few 
thousand pieces of printed parts within their vehicles (AP September 2015). However, the technol-
ogy is also still a long way from being used in mass production.
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Digitalization in the Indirect Areas: Towards the 
“Digital Factory”
The so-called “indirect” areas, which include product development, planning, produc-
tion control, quality assurance (and many other areas), have undergone a profound 
technological change since the 1990s. This change can be described by the term digi-
talization. In this paper, digitalization is understood as having two aspects. The first 
of these is the development of software systems, the standardization of data, and the 
collection, processing, and provision of this data. The second aspect is the use of the 
data thus created for the automation of calculations, tests, simulations, and evaluation 
processes. Digitalization thus opens up new possibilities for human workers, but at the 
same time creates the basis for automation and automates data processing.
There have been several drivers of digitalization in the automotive industry, many of 
which have been evident since the 1990s (and even earlier). First, competition in the 
industry has led manufacturers to greatly increase model diversity while at the same 
time shortening model cycles (Chanaron/Lung 1999). Second, since the 1990s, regu-
latory requirements for vehicle safety and vehicle efficiency (e.g., in terms of fuel con-
sumption) have increased (Krzywdzinski 2019). Both developments have massively 
increased the development cost of vehicles and directed the companies’ attention to 
potential productivity increases in this area. Lean production approaches were consis-
tent with this quest for productivity; they focused on optimization concepts for product 
development, planning, plant commissioning, maintenance, and logistics. In the 2000s 
and even more so in the 2010s, two new innovation topics that would require massive 
investments by companies in development capacities came into focus: electric mobili-
ty and autonomous driving (McKinsey 2016; Groshen et al. 2019).
As early as the 1980s, it was clear that Japanese automotive companies were much 
faster and more efficient than their European and American competitors, not only in 
production but also in product development (Fujimoto 2000). And indeed, research 
showed that the strength of Japanese companies in this area was not based on supe-
rior technical solutions but on their more efficient organizational structures (Fujimoto 
1997; Adler et al. 1999). Nevertheless, the search for rationalization in indirect areas 
also led to investment in technical improvements.
The following section examines digitalization in the automotive industry, focusing on 
product development, planning, and production control. There were certainly compa-
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rable developments in other areas, such as supply chain management,38 but these are 
not included for reasons of space.
The digitalization approaches of the 1990s—the first phase considered here—can be 
characterized as follows:
• Product development and planning: Automotive companies in Germany, the United 
States, and Japan focused on promoting the use of computer-aided design (CAD) 
software. In 1992, Daimler reported that the new Rastatt plant was the first factory 
to be designed and planned 100% using CAD.39 CAD became the standard for 
supplier companies as well.40 Based on CAD, new applications that changed the 
development and design process were created in the 1990s. New techniques such 
as stereolithography41 or fused deposition modeling42 used CAD data for rapid 
prototyping and accelerated the development process, as prototypes could be pro-
duced quickly and easily. The first software programs that used CAD data to simu-
late material behavior in the manufacturing process came onto the market and thus 
reduced the need for subsequent testing,43 but these were applications specialized 
for individual processes. The use of CAD was also meant to facilitate simultaneous 
engineering. The idea was for automobile manufacturers to cooperate directly with 
suppliers and equipment manufacturers during the development of vehicles and 
parts and to exchange data in order to develop parts and systems simultaneously 
(and not one after the other).44 Japanese companies pioneered simultaneous engi-
neering (Fujimoto 2000), but European and American companies followed suit. 
VW reported a reduction in the development time for the new Passat from 72 to 
27 months due to simultaneous engineering.45 In the 1990s, however, simultaneous 
engineering was still hampered by the lack of data standards, which made it diffi-
cult to transfer CAD data between companies. It was only in the second half of the 
1990s that uniform data standards for CAD were developed at all.46
38 The implementation of lean production and its core idea of just-in-time delivery were import-
ant drivers of the development of software-based supply chain management systems (Lamming 
1996; MacDuffie/Helper 1997; Mudambi/Helper 1998). This included the development of digital 
communication for the detailed call-off of parts from suppliers. Ford already used digital commu-
nication for supplier call-offs at the beginning of the 1990s, and Daimler plants were also equipped 
accordingly for new product ramp-ups (AP February 1993, July 1993).
39 AP July 1992
40 AP September 1992
41 The curing of a photopolymer under the influence of a light/laser.
42 The application of molten thermoplastic raw material through a thin nozzle.
43 AP April 1995, October 1999
44 AP September 1992
45 AP December 1996
46 AP April 1997
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• Production control and quality assurance: In the 1990s, the first steps were ta-
ken towards creating comprehensive connected networks in production, with the 
aim of better visualizing processes and simplifying production control.47 Projects 
involving machines that were equipped with sensors whose data were to be used 
for preventive maintenance were also launched.48 However, in the 1990s, these 
networks still encountered considerable problems. Only in the course of the 1990s 
did automobile factories switch from parallel wiring (where a separate line is laid 
for each signal) to serial wiring (a single line can transmit several signals; a field-
bus organizes communication based on a protocol); this considerably reduced the 
networking effort.49 Even then, however, there was still no uniform standard for 
different manufacturers’ fieldbuses, causing high integration costs for companies.50 
Digitalization in production was further promoted by the advent of computer aided 
quality (CAQ) concepts.51 The main drivers here were lean production and the 
emergence of certified quality assurance systems.52 In the 1990s, process-quali-
ty-related certification became a must for all automotive plants and suppliers and 
generated considerable documentation requirements. As a result, production lines 
were increasingly equipped with digital measuring devices, which were miniaturi-
zed in the 1990s and replaced the manual measuring devices that had been widely 
used until then.53 The Six Sigma concept spread the idea of statistical process cont-
rol, which had long been established in Japan and the USA (Petersen 1999; Leitner 
1999),54 throughout the German automotive industry. The first software packages 
developed specifically for the automotive industry came onto the market.
The 1990s can thus be seen as a period in which the first digitalization concepts were 
diffused in the automotive industry; however, due to a lack of standards, poor data qua-
lity, and limited networking technology, these were not able to reach their potential and 
resulted in specialized isolated solutions.55 There is little information about differences 
between German, American, and Japanese companies in the implementation of digital 
47 AP April 1995, June 1995, Special Edition A Class 1997
48 AP June 1995, April 2000
49 AP April 1992
50 AP February 1995
51 AP May 1992
52 A pioneer of this development was Ford’s Q1 certification system developed at the beginning of 
the 1980s. The first version of the global quality assurance standard ISO 9000ff was published in 
1987.
53 AP July 1998
54 AP May 1992
55 See e.g., AP Special Edition Audi A4 2001
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technology in this period. A study by Liker et al. (1992) concluded that there were 
hardly any differences in the use of CAD between American and Japanese companies 
in the early 1990s. In one of the few company studies, Okamuro (2000) showed that 
Toyota had an advantage over its European competitors in the use of CAD in product 
development and in the exchange of data with its suppliers—which Okamuro linked to 
the particularly close relationship between Japanese car manufacturers and their sup-
pliers. However, German manufacturers had largely caught up by the end of the 1990s, 
and they also made much greater efforts than the Japanese to harmonize CAD data 
within the global STEP standard (Standard for the Exchange of Product Model Data).
The still largely isolated digitalization projects of the 1990s culminated in the 2000s in 
an intensive discussion about the “Digital Factory”— more than ten years before the 
beginning of the Industry 4.0 discussion. In principle, the “Digital Factory” was sup-
posed to integrate all systems, but the focus was primarily on product development and 
production planning, with the promise that it would halve development and planning 
times. Companies saw enormous potential for cost reduction in this field, especially 
since the number of vehicle models offered by companies and their complexity increa-
sed at the same time.
Virtually all automotive companies (VW, Audi, Daimler, BMW, GM, Ford, but also 
many suppliers such as Bosch) developed plans for the “Digital Factory” and decla-
red it to be a central goal for the coming years—even if it soon became apparent that 
developments were progressing much more slowly than had been hoped.56 German 
companies such as Daimler, BMW, and Audi saw themselves as pioneers,57 while the 
American companies positioned themselves somewhat more cautiously. A senior ma-
nager of Ford’s Powertrain Division described his own company as a “cautious adop-
ter of new technology, but wants to be a fast second adopter” (AW 3 April 2013). Un-
fortunately, there is little information about developments in the Japanese automotive 
industry.
With regard to the areas examined here, the following developments can be identified 
in the 2000s:
• Product development and planning: The first central element of the “Digital Fac-
tory” was a further digitalization of product development. The focus was on deve-
loping so-called “virtual prototypes” and the use of virtual reality and simulations 
(of crash tests, vibrations, noise development, etc.) in order to reduce the effort in-
56 AP April 2002; AP June 2002; AW October 2004 und April 2008
57 AP October 2010, October 2012
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volved in developing, producing and testing prototypes.58 Companies also sought 
to use product development data directly for digital production planning.59 The 
companies hoped to enable the systematic use of virtual reality and material flow 
simulations as well as virtual commissioning, i.e. (partially automatic) programm-
ing of machines and production lines based on digital planning. The companies 
were pursuing ambitious goals, and Daimler announced that it intended to comple-
tely digitalize factory planning by 2005.60
• Production control and quality assurance: In the 2000s, the so-called industrial 
Ethernet became widely used in automotive plants.61 The Ethernet is a techno-
logy developed in the 1990s to locally network PCs in offices. In the 2000s, the 
industrial version of Ethernet became widely available, enabling local networks to 
be implemented in factories with significantly higher data rates than before; this 
met the safety and real-time requirements of the industrial environment. With the 
industrial Ethernet, networks were now cheaper and much more efficient. This 
enabled the proliferation of manufacturing execution systems (MES), which faci-
litated the monitoring of production processes.
The hopes placed in the “Digital Factory” were only partially met. In the course of the 
2000s, industry experts repeatedly noted that there was still a lack of precise material 
and process data and that there was no standardization of data.62 By the end of the 
2000s, a true integration of systems from product development through planning, ma-
nufacturing, logistics, and maintenance still had not occurred.63 The hoped-for halving 
of the planning time for new vehicle models was considered unrealistic early on.64 In 
2008, the head of the “Digital Factory” project for Daimler’s body shops said: “We got 
off to a massive start and ran into a massive wall” (AP January 2008: 54). It was only 
in the second half of the 2000s that activities to develop data standards intensified. 
A group coordinated by Daimler began to develop an automotive-specific format for 
automation data. This would meet the needs of production planning and commissio-
ning (AutomationML) and would be used as an open standard for the self-descrip-
tion of devices, machines, systems, control systems, and network components.65 With 
58 AP Special Edition C Class 2000; AP March 2007
59 AP Special Edition BMW 7 2001; AP April 2002
60 AP April 2002
61 AP February 2001; AP February 2002
62 AP October 2002; AP August 2005
63 AP January 2008; AP December 2010; AP October 2013
64 AP October 2002
65 AP April 2004; AP June 2007
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German companies playing a key role, the development of the “Open Platform Com-
munications—Unified Architecture” standard (OPC UA) began. The first version was 
published in 2010 and it is now increasingly becoming the dominant standard for ma-
chine networks (the industrial internet of things) in Europe (Lechowski/Krzywdzinski 
2019). In the second half of the 2000s, integrated software solutions for digital product 
development, production planning, simulation, and commissioning also came onto the 
market in the form of product lifecycle management (PLM) systems.66
The “Digital Factory” was additionally boosted by the discussion on Industry 4.0, 
which began in 2012, although it should be noted that automotive companies were 
rather indifferent to the first publications on Industry 4.0. Initial comments emphasi-
zed that the automotive industry had been working on the “Digital Factory” for over a 
decade, that it was aware of the difficulties, and that the Industry 4.0 concept did not 
provide any new approaches or solutions.67 In addition, the idea of self-organization of 
production, which was emphasized in the original Industry 4.0 publications (Acatech/
Forschungsunion 2013; Spath et al. 2013), was seen as incompatible with the precise 
takt planning and strict interlinking of processes that dominate the automotive indus-
try. The idea of self-organization implies that production is a decentralized system of 
independent agents, each of which reacts to the other. By contrast, in the lean produc-
tion systems dominating the automotive industry, production is a precisely defined 
(deterministic) chain of production steps that is set in motion by customer orders.
Despite initial skepticism about the idea of Industry 4.0, German companies in parti-
cular continued to work on digitalizing manufacturing. With regard to the areas this 
paper looks at, the following points should be emphasized:
• Product development and planning: Due to the availability of data and software 
systems, more and more companies started using virtual commissioning to shor-
ten production ramp-up processes during model changes.68 The PLM software pa-
ckages covered more and more areas of production planning.
• Production control and quality assurance: The increasing standardization of machi-
ne communication through standards such as OPC UA, the progressive equipping 
of production equipment with sensors, and the development of the mobile internet 
led to further networking in factories. Audi reported in 201669 that for the first time, 
all the shops in its automobile plants were connected with one another and that it 
66 AP September 2006; AP October 2007; AP October 2010
67 AP February 2013
68 AP June 2017
69 AP November 2016
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had established a central production control center that allows production, mate-
rial flows, and individual bodies to be tracked across all shops. Technologies such 
as RFID have become increasingly affordable and robust, and car manufacturers 
and suppliers have responded by developing specific standards for the use of these 
technologies in the automotive sector.70 Software development also progressed in 
the 2010s. In the press plants, for example, the rapid progress in equipping presses 
with sensors in the 2010s made it possible to collect precise data for process mo-
nitoring and control. These data could then enable the tools in the presses to react 
immediately if deviations from the desired status were detected.71 However, it is 
important to stress that press plants were relatively advanced in terms of “smart” 
control loops.72 The press shops were also an example of how networking between 
OEMs and equipment manufacturers has increased: Data from the presses could 
be used for simulations in product development and process planning.73 However, 
fragmentation of the data remained a problem. At the end of the 2010s, German 
companies therefore began to increase their investment in their IT architectures, 
as illustrated by the cooperation between VW, Siemens, and Amazon to develop a 
VW-specific industrial cloud.74
The developments described here did not just take place in Germany; they also happe-
ned in American automobile companies.75 However, there were important differences 
between the companies in both countries regarding their ambitions to develop their 
own digitalization competencies. A good example of this relates to the establishment 
of an industrial cloud for networking equipment in the companies. In the above-men-
tioned example of the cooperation between VW, Siemens, and Amazon in setting up 
a cloud for the VW Group, VW has sought to acquire its own development compe-
tencies itself. This is reflected in the company’s stated goal of bringing together 5,000 
computer scientists and software developers in the newly founded “Car.Software” unit 
in order to develop 60% of the software required in-house in future (the group cur-
rently estimates that 10% of the software used by the company is developed in house) 
(Volkswagen 2019; see also Cacilo/Haag 2018). General Motors has also been wor-
king on a project to develop an industrial cloud for its global factories since 2014.76 
70 AP June 2011
71 AP September 2015, AP January 2017; AP December 2018
72 AP September 2018
73 AP December 2014
74 AP June 2019
75 AW October 2004, December 2006, April 2008, August 2012, April 2013, February 2014
76 AMS July 2017; see also AMS August 2019
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The partners for this are the Japanese robot manufacturer Fanuc and the US network 
manufacturer Cisco. Interestingly, according to press reports, the responsibility for 
data analysis in terms of condition monitoring and preventive maintenance seems to 
have been outsourced to Fanuc.
The ambitions of the German car manufacturers and suppliers are particularly evident 
in the model factories, where new forms of digital technologies are being tested. One 
example is Daimler’s Factory 56 in Sindelfingen (Daimler 2020). According to the 
original plans, Factory 56 was due to start production in 2020 as a pure final assembly 
facility for the Daimler group’s luxury vehicles. It was to represent a new concept of 
modular assembly, with AGVs transporting all the required materials and the vehicles 
themselves. The aim was also to systematically test the use of big-data analyses and 
artificial intelligence in production. However, at the time of writing, Factory 56 had 
not yet started production, so it remains to be seen how much of the original plans can 
actually be realized.
Summary
The conclusions that arise as a result of this analysis of the development of automation 
and digitalization approaches in the automotive industry contradict the dominant argu-
ments in today’s discussions. There has been no major automation push in automotive 
production since the 1990s. Areas such as car body construction were already automa-
ted in the 1980s and 1990s and a gradual further development of the technology is un-
derway in these areas—even if it can be assumed that there was catch-up automation 
in the 1990s and 2000s for latecomers, especially in the supplier sector. The assembly 
processes remain a bastion of manual work.
In contrast, the work processes in development, planning, quality assurance, and pro-
duction control have undergone a massive digitalization process since the 1990s. Pro-
duct development and planning account for a significant proportion of the total costs of 
the automotive industry, and increasing the efficiency of these processes has been one 
of the main objectives of the industry since the 1990s. According to the companies, 
developments such as CAD, CAQ, various simulation software packages, virtual rea-
lity, and the integrated concepts of PLM software have led to considerable reductions 
in the time required for development and planning. However, it must be emphasized 
that the productivity gains in these areas have not been systematically researched. 
In particular, it is unclear how technical and organizational innovations intertwined. 
Technical innovations can only reach their full potential if they are accompanied by the 
development of suitable organizational structures. For example, the integration of data 
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and software systems is only feasible and can only unleash its full potential if it occurs 
within structures that promote cross-functional and cross-divisional cooperation.
All of these developments have taken different forms in the three countries examined 
here—Germany, the United States, and Japan. With regard to manufacturing proces-
ses, the available data suggest that German companies have made the greatest attempts 
to push automation and digitalization, while Japanese companies in particular seem 
to have moved away from the goal of automation, especially in the assembly sector. 
As far as the American automotive industry is concerned, the reporting in the press 
suggests that companies have been very reluctant to invest in automation and digitali-
zation, especially since the global economic crisis.
4.2. Changing Automation Levels – Analysis of the 
Robot Statistics
In both the public and academic debates, the number of robot installations and the ro-
bot density (industrial robots per thousand employees) have become the indicator par 
excellence for automation. What does this indicator show us? How does the develop-
ment of robot use relate to the development of automation and digitalization approa-
ches described in the previous section?
As Figure 2 shows, the use of industrial robots in the German and American automotive 
industry has increased continuously. While, in the early 1990s, about 10,000–30,000 
robots each were installed in the automotive industry in both countries, by 2018 this 
number had risen to 128,000 in the United States and 108,000 in Germany.
The situation in Japan was somewhat different. The statistics show that about 90,000 
industrial robots were already installed in the Japanese automotive industry in the ear-
ly 1990s. This number remained constant in the 1990s, but the Japanese figures before 
2000 are difficult to interpret because it was not until 2000 that the definitions of indus-
trial robots used in Japan and the other countries were harmonized. The Japanese figu-
res before 2000 overestimated the number of industrial robots compared to Germany 
and the USA. The figures after harmonization show an increase to a peak of 139,000 
robots by 2008, after which the robot population fell back to around 100,000 by 2018. 
During this period, there has been no major revision of the methods used to survey the 
robot population, and there has been a corresponding decrease in new installations, so 
it is assumed here that the decline reflects a real trend.
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Figure 2: Stock of industrial robots in the automotive industry in Germany, 
Japan, and the United States, 1993–2018
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Source: IFR, own calculations.
The larger number of robots in the United States compared to Germany and Japan 
must be considered in light of the size of the automotive industry in the three count-
ries. Since robots are only used in industrial production processes, the robot density 
has been calculated below as the stock of robots per 1000 blue-collar workers, with 
blue-collar workers including both direct production workers and workers in indirect 
functions such as maintenance, commissioning, and others (Figure 3). It should also be 
noted that automotive companies generally work in two or three shifts. As no statisti-
cal data on shift systems in the automotive industry are available, it was assumed that 
the two-shift mode is characteristic of the automotive industry in the three countries 
studied. Arguably, this somewhat underestimates the robot density, since at least some 
of the companies utilize three-shift systems.
Figure 3: Stock of industrial robots in the automotive industry per thousand 
blue-collar workers in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 1995–2018 (as-
sumption: Two-shift system)
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Source: Own calculations based on IFR, BLS, VDA.
In the United States, robot density increased from about 100 robots per thousand 
blue-collar workers in the 1990s to 320 in 2018, but it should be noted that robot 
density has hardly increased since 2009, which may reflect the limited investment 
32
by companies in their production equipment since the economic crisis. A continuous 
increase in robot density can be observed in Germany, although here too growth has 
slowed down somewhat over the last decade. In 2018, 390 robots were used per thou-
sand blue-collar employees.
In Japan, the robot density reached its peak in 2008 with 500 robots per thousand 
blue-collar employees, only to decline again to 360 robots in 2015. For the years after 
2015, there are as yet no occupational statistics available for Japan that would enable 
calculations of the number of blue-collar workers. However, the number of robots 
installed has remained largely constant, and employment has also remained stable in 
these years, so that a largely constant robot density can be assumed.
The decline in robot density in the Japanese automotive industry after 2008 is remar-
kable because it contradicts the perception widespread in today’s debates. It is con-
sistent with our account of developments in Japanese companies, which have tended 
to abandon automation in assembly. The car body manufacturing is, of course, highly 
automated in Japanese automotive companies. The Japanese companies are, however, 
cautious about automation if it could restrict flexibility. The decline of the number of 
robots in the body shop could be related to changes in the product architecture and the 
introduction of simpler equipment (as in the case of the Global Body Line of Toyota), 
or to the abandonment of automation steps, for instance regarding material handling.
The contrast between the development of robot density and the qualitative analysis of 
automation approaches is striking. The qualitative analyses make it clear that the robot 
density indicator by no means reflects the development of automation levels. First, the 
above analysis has shown that automation takes many forms and is only performed by 
robots in some work processes: mainly in welding, painting, and material handling. 
This means that the focus on robot density might underestimate the extent of automa-
tion, for instance in mechanical engineering which relies on machine tools and not on 
robots. Second, the example of car body construction in particular shows that an in-
crease in the number of robots does not necessarily mean a rising level of automation, 
but rather reflects the increasing complexity of the equipment and the manufacturing 
process, as well as the variety of machining processes and materials. This implies that 
the robot density indicator overestimates automation.
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5. Changing Occupational 
Structures in the Automotive 
Industry Since the 1990s
To what extent are automation and digitalization approaches connected to changes in 
employment structures in the automotive industry? In the following, we will approach 
this question step by step. This section starts by looking at changes in employment 
volume and then moves on to analyze the composition by occupations.
5.1. Employment and Production
In terms of employment volume, the national automotive industries in Germany, the 
United States, and Japan are relatively similar, although there have been differences 
in the development of employment over time. It should be noted that it is not possible 
here to account for structural differences in the composition of the various national 
industries and their links to other countries: For example, the German automotive 
industry is closely intertwined with that of its Central Eastern European neighbors 
(Krzywdzinski 2014; Jürgens/Krzywdzinski 2010 and 2009) and the automotive in-
dustry in the United States is closely integrated with that of Mexico (Klier/Rubenstein 
2010); in contrast, the automotive industry in Japan is less integrated with the industry 
in Japan’s Southeast Asian neighbors (Kobayashi et al. 2015).
As Figure 4 shows, Germany and Japan had relatively constant employment volumes 
in the period examined here, at around 800,000 persons in each country. In the case of 
Germany, the 1990s began with a crisis in which employment fell to just over 700,000 
persons. However, it recovered in the second half of the 1990s and again reached 
levels well above 800,000. In the global economic crisis around 2008, employment 
again declined to levels around 700,000, only to climb again in the following years 
to 880,000 in 2018. In the case of Japan, the 1990s were characterized by a slow de-
cline in automobile employment, which reached its lowest point in 2001, with around 
720,000 persons employed in the industry. After that, employment rose to well over 
800,000 before falling again to values below 800,000 during the global economic cri-
sis and then rising to 916,000 by 2018.
Employment in the American automotive industry took a more dramatic course. It rose 
until the end of the 1990s and peaked in the year 2000 at over 1,300,000 employees. 
After that, it fell continuously and reached its lowest point in the global economic crisis 
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at 660,000 people. The global economic crisis was a massive rupture in the American 
automotive industry, which pushed the manufacturers GM and Chrysler to insolvency 
(and Ford to near insolvency); ultimately, a rescue package from the American go-
vernment was needed to resolve it (Klier/Rubenstein 2012). The crisis was particularly 
pronounced in the United States because the collapse in demand caused by the global 
economic crisis overlapped with a prolonged decline in the market shares of the Big 
Three in their home market: From the mid-1990s until the outbreak of the crisis, this 
market share fell from around 75% to below 50% (Klier/Rubenstein 2012). The crisis 
had dramatic consequences for the companies: Costs had to be reduced over a period 
of years (Goolsbee/Krueger 2015). In addition, the companies suffered an enormous 
loss of knowledge and skills due to the elimination of several hundred thousand jobs 
within a few years. Although employment rose again from 2009 and reached almost 
1,000,000 people in 2018, knowledge and skills had to be rebuilt (Katz et al. 2013).
Figure 4: Employment in the automotive industry in Germany, Japan, and the 
United States (1993–2018)
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The employment decline in the years of the global economic crisis is also reflected in 
production trends (Figure 5). This slump was particularly severe in the United States. 
While annual production was around 12 million vehicles in the 1990s, it collapsed 
by half during the crisis but recovered to values between 11 and 12 million by 2018. 
In Japan, production was around 10 million vehicles in the 1990s, rose to just under 
12 million just before the crisis, and then slumped to 8 million, before leveling off at 
values around 10 million vehicles. In Germany, production in the early 1990s was at 
a low point of around 4 million vehicles per year; it subsequently rose to values of 
around 6 million and then slumped only briefly and weakly during the global econo-
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mic crisis. However, in 2017/8, a slump was recorded again—in this case triggered by 
the so-called “dieselgate” scandal.
Figure 5: Vehicle production in Germany, Japan, and the United States (1993–2018)
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5.2. Occupational Structure of the Workforce 
The three countries examined differ considerably in terms of their employment struc-
tures. The analysis will begin by looking at the development of the share of blue-collar 
workers in total employment (Figure 6) and will then turn to the share of engineers 
and computer scientists. Blue-collar workers are defined as workers in production, 
logistics, and construction (although the latter group is found only in small numbers in 
the automotive industry).
In the case of the American automobile industry, the share of blue-collar workers has 
remained surprisingly constant at around 80% since the 1990s. The absolute numbers 
of blue-collar workers employed have followed the general trend in the industry: The-
se declined sharply during the crisis of 2009 and then recovered to nearly 800,000 
workers in 2018. The trend in Germany deviated significantly from this. Here, there 
was a continuous decline in the share of blue-collar workers in total employment, from 
around 70% at the end of the 1990s to 60% in 2018. Given the positive employment 
trends in the sector, this decline does not mean that there was any loss of employment 
in absolute terms; in fact, the number of blue-collar workers remained relatively sta-
ble during the period under review, at around 500,000. Nevertheless, the extent of the 
change is remarkable: There has been a very evident and ongoing loss of importance 
of manufacturing employment. The situation is similar, even if less dramatic, in Japan. 
Here, the share of blue-collar workers declined from over 70% in the late 1990s to 
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67% in 2015, but given the positive employment trends in the industry, this was not 
associated with an absolute decline in the number of workers, which reached over 
570,000 people in 2015.
Figure 6: Share of blue-collar workers (production, logistics, construction) in 
the total employment in the automotive industry in Germany, Japan, and the 
United States
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Source: Own calculation based on BLS, SBJ, and BA. Major statistical revisions are marked by ||.
In contrast to blue-collar workers, the share of engineers and computer scientists 
in employment in the automotive sector is increasing (Figure 7). This analysis only 
considers employment in the automotive industry itself—the employees of machine/
equipment builders and IT service providers who work for automotive companies but 
are not themselves assigned to the automotive industry are not included. This implies 
that the analysis shows the extent to which car manufacturers and automotive suppliers 
themselves create employment in engineering and IT jobs. It cannot say anything about 
the extent to which automotive companies buy in corresponding expertise externally.
In the USA, the BLS data from 2002 onwards show that, as a proportion of the total 
automotive industry workforce, engineers made up 6–7%. This figure did not differ for 
car manufacturers and suppliers. Prior to 2002, the proportion of engineers was higher, 
at around 10%, but a major change in the industry statistics occurred in 2002, meaning 
that the decrease after 2002 may be a statistical artefact. The stable share of engineers 
from 2002 onwards means that their numbers followed overall employment trends in 
the industry. The figure decreased to a low of 40,000–50,000 people until the crisis in 
2009 and then slowly increased again to reach 63,000 in 2018. The term “engineers” 
here refers to all persons in the “architecture and engineering occupations” (17-0000), 
which, in the case of the automotive industry, mainly includes engineers (environmen-
tal engineers, industrial engineers, mechanical engineers, materials engineers, miscel-
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laneous engineers) and drafters and engineering technicians. In the American system, 
the latter usually have a two-year post-high-school (but non-university) education at 
technical schools or community colleges. Drafters and engineering technicians ac-
count for about a quarter of all engineers and technicians in the American automotive 
industry. 
The proportion of computer scientists in the American automotive industry rose slow-
ly from about half a percent of the total automotive workforce at the beginning of the 
2000s to just under 1% in 2018. Here, the term “computer scientist” refers to all groups 
of activities in the category “computer and mathematical occupations” (15-0000). In 
the case of the automotive industry, this category mainly includes software developers 
and programmers, database and systems administrators, network architects, compu-
ter support specialists, and operations research analysts and statisticians. In absolute 
terms, the numbers of computer scientists employed in the industry decreased only 
slightly during the economic crisis in 2009 from over 6000 to just over 5000 people. 
Since then, employment in the computer professions has risen, reaching 8200 people 
in 2018.
Figure 7: Share of engineers/technicians and computer scientists in the total em-
ployment in the automotive industry in Germany, Japan, and the United States 
Source: Own calculation based on BLS, SBJ, and BA. Dashed lines mark major revisions of the indus-
try and/or occupational classifications that limit the comparability of the data.
Trends in the employment of engineers and computer scientists in Japan differ from 
those in the United States—although here, too, there was a major change in the sta-
tistics between 2000 and 2010 that must be taken into account.77 The data show an 
77 The absolute figures are based on the classification used in the respective census years.
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increasing share of engineers in the total automotive industry workforce, from 6–7% 
in the early 2000s to over 11% in 2015. In absolute terms, this means that the number 
of engineers almost doubled, from about 50,000 in the 1990s to about 100,000 in 2015. 
Here, the category engineers mainly includes “transportation equipment engineers” 
and “machinery engineers”; in addition, there are “electrical and telecommunications 
engineers,” “metal engineers,” “chemical engineers,” and others. In the Japanese sta-
tistics, there is no category comparable to the American engineering technicians. Some 
studies indicate that Japanese companies in the automotive sector also have a group of 
employees comparable to engineering technicians (Shibata 2009), but it is unclear in 
which statistical category these employees are categorized. It is therefore possible that 
the figures shown here underestimate the development in Japan.
The share of computer scientists in the Japanese automotive industry has also risen, 
from 0.7% in 2000 to 0.9% of total employment in 2015. In absolute terms, this me-
ans an increase from around 6,000 to over 8,000 people. In the Japanese statistics, the 
computer scientist category is fairly undifferentiated and includes “system designers,” 
“software developers,” and “other data processing and communication engineers.”
Once again, the strongest change dynamics can be seen in Germany, although here, 
too, the figures must be interpreted with caution due to statistical revisions.78 In this 
case, the statistics show that engineers and technicians accounted for 12% of total au-
tomotive industry employment in 2000, and this share rose to around 18% by 2018. In 
absolute terms, this means an increase in the number of engineers and technicians from 
about 70,000–80,000 to about 160,000. As Schwarz-Kocher et al. (2019) have argued, 
this development was driven by both car manufacturers and automotive suppliers. The 
category of engineers and technicians is highly differentiated in the German statistics, 
and we do not list all the individual activity groups here. In principle, the engineer 
category includes persons whose work requires a master’s or master’s-equivalent uni-
versity degree (defined as “expert level” in the German 2010 classification of occu-
pations (KldB)). Technicians are persons whose work requires a bachelor’s degree or 
a technician’s diploma (a non-university, post-high-school qualification) (“specialist 
level”). Technicians make up about one third of the group of engineers and technicians 
in the German automotive industry.
The number of computer scientists is also increasing in Germany. As a proportion 
of total automotive industry employment, their share rose from about 1% in 2000 
to over 2% in 2018. In absolute figures, this means an increase from about 7,000 to 
78 The absolute figures according to WZ93 and KldB1988 respectively WZ2008 and KldB2010.
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about 19,000 people. This group is also recorded in great detail in the German statis-
tics (KldB2010) and includes computer scientists without specialization, business in-
formation scientists, technical computer scientists, IT system analysts, IT application 
consultants, IT network technologists, IT system administrators, software developers, 
programmers, and database developers.
The differences in the development of the number of engineers and computer scientists 
in the German, American, and Japanese automotive industries are striking. There is 
reason to argue that they reflect the differences in the digitalization and automation ap-
proaches of German, Japanese and American companies, and especially the high-tech 
orientation of German companies. However, alternative explanations are also concei-
vable and will be briefly discussed here.
One possible reason pertains to their different outsourcing and skill-acquisition stra-
tegies. For example, American companies may be outsourcing their design and de-
velopment activities to a particularly high degree, or they may be developing their 
competences in the field of new technologies primarily through acquisitions, whereby 
the acquired companies remain formally independent and are not recorded statistically 
in the automotive industry. German companies, on the other hand, might try to build 
up the same competences internally.
This question is difficult to answer with the available data. It certainly plays a role 
that the American companies have considerably globalized their product development 
activities. Even if all car manufacturers have a global structure of development centers 
(Florida/Kenney 1994; Calabrese 2001; Lara/Carillo 2003), this applies most strongly 
to American companies. In the case of Ford, passenger car development takes place 
mainly in the development center in Cologne (Germany), while the product develop-
ment in the United States itself is concentrating on pickups. General Motors has also 
largely shifted the development of passenger cars abroad (China and Korea; until the 
sale of Opel, also Germany), while the company’s American development activities 
are focusing primarily on pickups and vans. According to interviews with automotive 
experts, more than 85% of the passenger cars produced in the U.S. are developed ab-
road, and this also applies to the majority of SUV models. Only in the case of pickups 
and sports cars is product development still predominantly located in the U.S. This is 
certainly reducing the proportion of engineers and computer scientists in employment 
in the American automotive industry.
The structure of the industry may be another reason for the differences. The German 
and Japanese automotive industries are strongly dominated by domestic companies, 
which have both their production and product development sites in the respective 
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countries. In the American automotive industry, by contrast, transplants of Japane-
se and German automotive manufacturers and suppliers play a very important role 
(Florida/Kenney 1991; Rubenstein 2002). These transplants produce for the American 
market, but the product development activities are not located in the USA.
In addition, studies show a significant growth in the outsourcing of design and en-
gineering activities by American companies (MacPherson/Vanchan 2010). However, 
in the automotive industry, this applies to all countries, including Germany (VDA 
2015)—the question of whether outsourcing processes were more pronounced in the 
United States than elsewhere cannot be answered with the available data. However, it 
is clear that European (and above all German) companies are particularly strong in the 
area of engineering services (VDA 2015).
The externalization of engineering and software development skills may also have 
taken the form of acquisitions. Indeed, American companies have invested massively 
in tech start-ups since 2016. General Motors took over the mobility services start-up 
Sidecar in 2016, and in the same year, it invested more than half a billion dollars in the 
autonomous driving start-up Cruise Automation. In 2017, it expanded its portfolio to 
include the lidar technology developer Strobe. Since 2016, Ford has acquired several 
mobility services providers (Chariot, Autonomic.AI, TransLoc), AI startups (SAIPS), 
and autonomous driving startups (Argo AI, Quantum Signal AI), Even FiatChrysler 
invested in this area, in StartMeUp, an autonomous driving startup, and in LeddarTech 
(specializing in lidar technology).
The start-ups and IT companies discussed here employ a larger number of highly qua-
lified computer scientists and engineers. Hence, if we take these into account, this 
somewhat reduces the gap in the number of engineers in the American and the German 
automotive industry. Cruise Automation—by far the largest of the start-ups acquired—
employed around 1,000 developers in 2019 and planned to double this number soon 
(The Newswheel 2019). However, it should be noted that German car manufacturers 
are also investing in tech start-ups. In 2017, for example, Volkswagen took a mul-
ti-billion dollar stake in Argo AI (and is cooperating with Ford here); it also bought 
the lidar startup Aeva, the mobility services startup Split Finland Oy, and the mobi-
le payment provider PayByPhone. Daimler invested primarily in mobility services 
start-ups (Chauffer Privé, Flinc, Ridescout, CleverTaxi, MyTaxi, Taxibeat), but it also 
acquired Torc Robotic, a start-up specializing in autonomous driving for trucks, for a 
three-digit million euro amount in 2019. The German car manufacturers have also set 
up large venture capital funds to expand their involvement in the start-up sector. So far, 
Japanese car manufacturers have been very reluctant to invest, but Toyota launched a 
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Toyota AI Ventures fund in Silicon Valley in 2018. In the same year, Renault-Nissan 
also established a similar fund.
The investments made by American car companies in software start-ups can therefore 
put the differences in the employment of engineers and computer scientists between 
the American, German, and Japanese car industries into perspective; however, they 
cannot eliminate them. Moreover, German companies are massively expanding their 
engineering and software development capacities, whereas this does not seem to apply 
to American companies to the same extent.
5.3. Structural Change within the Production 
Workforce
How did employment change within the production workforce? The basic structure of 
the occupational statistics is similar for all three countries examined here and allows to 
distinguish five major occupational groups:
• Assembly workers: This group includes workers engaged in manual production 
work. In the case of car manufacturers, this group is mainly found in the assembly 
areas that have so far only been automated to a limited extent.
• Metal workers: This group is to be found in metal production (especially foun-
dries), metalworking (e.g. operating machine tools), metal construction (especially 
welding processes in car body construction) and toolmaking.
• Maintenance and commissioning of production equipment.
• Other production occupations: These include, for example, textile workers (e.g. 
upholsterers in seat manufacture), painters or quality control workers.
• Shop floor supervisors (in Germany the “Meister” level).
The exact breakdown of these five occupational groups differs considerably in the natio-
nal statistics. It should be noted that these groups do not directly reflect the distinction 
between skilled and semi-skilled workers, which is central to research in the sociology 
of work. Discussions in the sociology of work about the course of automation processes 
and their consequences have revolved around the question of the extent to which there 
is a re-professionalization of production work and a reduction of highly standardized, 
repetitive work content (cf. Kern/Schumann 1984; Jürgens et al. 1993; Schumann et al. 
1994; Kuhlmann 2004) or rather a deskilling trend (Braverman 1974). The official occu-
pational statistics can only provide very indirect answers to this question. For example, 
the occupational groups in the maintenance and commissioning of production facilities 
are certainly almost exclusively made up of skilled workers. In the assembly and metal-
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working activity groups, however, there are both skilled and semi-skilled workers - the 
official statistics do not provide any information about the ratio.
What the statistics can tell us is the ratio of manual production work on the product 
compared to control work in automated processes. As the qualitative analysis has 
shown, manual work in the automotive industry is heavily concentrated in assembly 
areas. We can therefore use the development of assembly-related occupations as an 
indicator of the importance of manual work. The processes of metal production and 
machining, on the other hand, have been highly automated for a long time - the activi-
ties here consist mainly of control work.
Table 1: Occupational composition of production workers in the U.S. automotive industry
1999 2007 2012 2018
Total 674,600 
(100%)
738,400 
(100%)
532,000 
(100%)
732,300 
(100%)
Assemblers and Fabricators (51-2000) n/a 319,800 
(43.3%)
248,600 
(46.7%)
377,000 
(51.5%)
Metal and Plastic Workers (51-4000)
Of which:
n/a n/a 154,200 
(29.0%)
185,200 
(25.3%)
Computer Control Programmers and 
Operators (51-4010)
11,500 
(1.7%)
15,500 
(2.1%)
16,200 
(3.0%)
13,910 
(1.9%)
Forming Machine Operators (51-4020) 13,600 
(2.0%)
n/a 8,600 
(1.6%)
8,000 
(1.1%)
Machine Tool Operators (51-4030) 42,600 
(6.3%)
53,200 
(7.2%)
30,000 
(5.6%)
35,700 
(4.9%)
Machinists (51-4040) 14,800 
(2.2%)
32,500 
(4.4%)
23,500 
(4.4%)
23,600 
(3.2%)
Molders, molding machine operators 
(51-4070)
14,700 
(2.2%)
n/a 8,500 
(1.6%)
15,000 
(2.0%)
Tool and die makers (4110) 16,100 
(2.4%)
19,700 
(2.7%)
15,600 
(2.9%)
14,300 
(1.9%)
Welding workers (4120) 40,800 
(6.0%)
46,700 
(6.3%)
35,500 
(6.7%)
44,850 
(6.1%)
Other Production Occupations (51-5000 
bis 51-9000)
Of which:
n/a n/a 65,800 
(12.4%)
80,000 
(10.9%)
Painting workers  
(51-9120)
15,100 
(2.2%)
14,700 
(2.0%)
11,200 
(2.1%)
14,000 
(1.9%)
Inspectors (51-9060) 34,500 
(5.1%)
31,500 
(4.3%)
22,200 
(4.2%)
31,100 
(4.2%)
Installation and maintenance occupations 
(49-000)
58,800 
(8.7%)
61,900 
(8.4%)
38,800 
(7.3%)
50,400 
(6.9%)
First-line supervisors (51-1000) 27,500 
(4.1%)
33,900 
(4.6%)
24,600 
(4.6%)
39,700 
(5.4%)
Source: Author based on BLS. Major revisions of statistical classifications that limit the comparability 
of data are marked by bold lines.
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Table 1 presents the trends for the U.S. automobile industry. It shows remarkable sta-
bility in the occupational structure. The most important changes are:
• The proportion of assembly workers has slightly increased. In absolute terms, alt-
hough the numbers of assembly workers collapsed during the crisis of 2008/09, it 
then returned to a high level.
• The proportion of workers in metal occupations, by contrast, is declining. This re-
lative decrease has mainly affected machine operators, while there has been hardly 
any change in the share of welding and painting workers, i.e., workers in the areas 
most affected by the use of robots in automotive engineering. This could be an 
indicator that, in recent decades, automation has not so much led to a direct subs-
titution of human labor by robots—areas such as car body construction have been 
highly automated for some time and the major employment effects occurred a 
long time ago. Important changes in process technologies seem to relate primarily 
to digital process control technologies, which can, for instance, enable a smaller 
number of workers to operate a larger machine park.
• The share of maintenance and installation professions is decreasing. This could 
be related to new process control techniques, but it could also be due to an increa-
sing implementation of preventive maintenance. Organizational changes may also 
be underway, such as a greater integration of maintenance tasks into production 
teams.
Table 2: Occupational composition of production workers in the U.S. automotive 
industry in 2018
Motor vehicle 
manufacturing 
(NAICS 3361)
Motor vehicle body 
and trailer manufac-
turing (NAICS 3362)
Motor vehicle pats 
manufacturing 
(NAICS 3363)
Total 187,600 (100%) 121,000 (100%) 423,900 (100%)
Assemblers and Fabricators 141,100 (75.2%) 60,600 (50.0%) 175,200 (41.3%)
Metal and Plastic Workers 14,900 (7.9%) 31,500 (26.0%) 138,800 (32.7%)
Other Production Occupations 10,400 (5.5%) 16,500 (13.6%) 53,200 (12.5%)
Installation and maintenance 
occupations
11,100 (5.9%) 6,400 (5.3%) 33,000 (7.8%)
First-line supervisors 10,000 (5.3%) 6,000 (4.9%) 23,600 (5.6%)
Source: Author based on BLS.
The trends outlined above apply to both car manufacturers and suppliers, albeit at very 
different levels. In the case of car manufacturers (NAICS 3361), assembly workers 
even account for 75% of production workers (Table 2). The press and body shops are 
highly automated and employ few workers. The picture is different for suppliers. In 
this case, almost 33% of the production workers still work in metal production and 
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processing occupations; here, too, however, 41% of the production workers are still 
working in assembly operations.
In the case of the Japanese occupational statistics (Table 3), it should be noted that the 
occupational designations tend to focus more on organizational areas and refer less to 
the specific function of the employees than is the case in the U.S. statistics. Further-
more, shop floor supervisors are not recorded as a separate category. However, very 
similar trends as in the USA are evident here.
• Assembly employment has remained largely stable in absolute terms and is gai-
ning relative importance within the group of production workers. The share of as-
sembly employment in Japan is significantly higher than in the USA, but note that 
it also includes shop floor supervisors. Given that the production teams in Japan 
are rather small (and the number of shop floor supervisors is accordingly high), the 
proportion of assembly workers is could be similar to American levels.
Table 3: Occupational composition of production workers in the Japanese auto-
motive industry
1995 2005 2010 2015
Total 629,300 (100%) 567,200 (100%) 553,600 (100%) 561,600 (100%)
Assembly workers 
(JSOC 51a-51f)
299,300 (47.6%) 352,400 (62.1%) 331,200 (59.8%) 351,000 (62.5%)
Metal Workers (JSOC 
49a-49j/581-585)
Of which:
241,700 (38.4%) 143,200 (25.2%) 156,000 (28.2%) 145,800 (26.0%)
Machine tool workers 
(JSOC 49d)
29,900 (4.7%) 28,800 (5.1%) 19,600 (3.5%) 16,900 (3.0%)
Metal press workers 
(JSOC 49e)
27,300 (4.3%) 18,300 (3.2%) 12,700 (2.3%) 11,700 (2.1%)
Welding process work-
ers (JSOC 49i)
24,200 (3.8%) 18,200 (3.2%) 15,300 (2.8%) 14,200 (2.5%)
Machine inspection 
workers (JSOC 581-
585)
(included in 
other subcatego-
ries)
(included in 
other subcatego-
ries)
73,600 (13.3%) 71,700 (12.8%)
Other Production Occu-
pations
Of which:
54,700 (8.7%) 44,500 (7.8%) 40,000 (7.2%) 37,700 (6.7%)
Painting workers 19,700 (3.1%) 16,900 (3.0%) 15,900 (2.9%) 14,900 (2.6%)
Maintenance and repair 
workers (JSOC 551-555)
28,400 (4.5%) 24,300 (4.3%) 26,300 (4.7%) 27,100 (4.8%)
Source: Author based on SBJ. Occupational categories based on 2015 JSOC. Major revisions of sta-
tistical classifications that limit the comparability of data are marked by bold lines.
• The share of employees in metalworking occupations has decreased. In contrast 
to the USA, however, the decrease has affected almost all occupations, including 
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welding process workers (and painting workers). This trend was particularly mar-
ked in the years 1995–2005, but continued thereafter—although the data is diffi-
cult to interpret due to the introduction of a new occupation (the “machine inspec-
tion workers”79). Again, this suggests that the employment-relevant developments 
in the field of automation in recent decades have not affected manual work or 
substituted for it but rather have led to a greater digitalization of process control, 
which has led to automated metalworking equipment being operated by a smaller 
group of employees. The declining numbers of body shop workers, in contrast to 
the trend in the United States, could also be related to efforts to automate insertion 
activities using material-handling robots.
The proportion of maintenance workers in Japan is lower than in the United States, 
which is plausible in view of the greater integration of maintenance activities into the 
tasks of production teams (Adler 1995; Jürgens 2015). It is not possible to calculate 
a breakdown by car manufacturers and suppliers with the Japanese census data used 
here.
When seeking to interpret trends in occupational composition in the German auto-
motive industry (Table 4), there are several challenges. The first difficulty is that the 
German statistics do not focus as clearly as the Japanese statistics on the organizatio-
nal areas in which workers are employed (e.g., assembly, maintenance, etc.) and at 
the same time the occupations are much broader than in the American statistics. For 
example, it is not possible to pin down the group of assembly workers exactly. While 
the American and Japanese occupational statistics identify assembly workers as a se-
parate group, this is not the case in Germany. In the analysis presented here, the follo-
wing KldB1988 occupational groups were classified as assembly-related: machine and 
equipment assemblers, general assemblers, machine fitters, electrical equipment as-
semblers and helpers. In KldB2010, the new occupational classification introduced in 
2010, the occupations have been grouped together to an even greater extent. Based on 
the equivalence tables for the transition from KldB1988 to KldB2010, the following 
occupations have been classified as assembly-related: not-specialized occupations in 
machine-building and operating occupations (Maschinenbau- und Betriebstechnik-
berufe), machinery and equipment assemblers (Maschinen- und Gerätezusammenset-
79 “Machine inspection workers” is the term used by the SBJ to translate the Japanese category. This 
category is somewhat mysterious, given that it includes around half of all workers in metalwork-
ing occupations. According to the description provided by the SBJ, these workers are “engaged in 
the inspection of intermediate and final products in the production activities of various machines” 
(SBJ 2015). This could include quality control workers, but also the machine operators responsible 
for feeding and checking parts produced by the machines.
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zer), technical occupations in the automotive industry (Kraftfahrzeugtechnikberufe), 
and occupations in electrical engineering (Elektrotechnikberufe). However, this clas-
sification is not very clear-cut: For example, the category of technical occupations in 
the automotive industry includes occupations that are common in assembly areas but 
also found in other areas. The same problem applies to maintenance activities—these 
cannot be precisely narrowed down. Here, the German statistics differentiate between 
specialized occupations in machinery and equipment assembly (technical service staff 
in maintenance and repair), mechatronics and automation technology, and technical 
occupations in the maintenance of electric machines. Again, the classification is not 
very clear-cut, because mechatronics technicians are a kind of universal occupation 
in the automotive industry and are used in maintenance but also in the operation of 
automated equipment.
The second major difficulty in interpreting the data relates to the two major statistical 
changes that took place between 2008 and 2012: There was a major revision of sector 
classifications and of occupational classifications. Therefore, in order to capture trends 
in occupational groups, the analysis considered developments between 1999 and 2007 
and between 2013 and 2018 separately and only identified a general trend if both co-
incided.
• In general, it should be noted that, in the German automotive industry, the propor-
tion of workers in assembly activities—as far as these can be narrowed down—is 
significantly lower than in the United States and Japan. This could be due to the shift 
of labor-intensive production processes (assembly) to the low-wage countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe in recent decades, particularly among automotive sup-
pliers (Jürgens/Krzywdzinski 2009 and 2010; Krzywdzinski 2014; Schwarz-Ko-
cher et al. 2019)—the slightly higher automation of assembly processes in German 
automotive plants compared with those Japan and the United States cannot explain 
this large difference. There is no clear trend in the share of assembly employment 
in the German automotive industry over the past 10–20 years.
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Table 4: Occupational composition of production workers in the German auto-
motive industry
1999 2007 2013 2018
Total 394,200 
(100%)
410,400 
(100%)
458,800 
(100%)
487,500 
(100%)
Assembly-related occupations 113,100 
(28.7%)
135,500 
(32.9%)
163,800 
(35.7%)
169,800 
(34.7%)
Metal occupations
Of which:
185,500 
(47.0%)
180,300 
(44.0%)
152,000 
(33.1%)
161,300 
(33.1%)
Metal-making occupations 5,100 (1.3%) 4,500 (1.1%) 7,400 (1.6%) 7,700 (1.6%)
Metalworking occupations 93,800 (23.8%) 89,900 (21.9%) 68,700 (15.0%) 69,300 (14.2%)
Occupations in metal con-
structing and welding
59,900 (15.2%) 57,700 (14.0%) 25,900 (5.6%) 26,200 (5.4%)
Precision mechanics and 
toolmaking
13,600 (3.4%) 13,000 (3.2%) 12,700 (2.8%) 11,500 (2.4%)
Plant and machine oper-
ators
13,000 (3.3%) 14,600 (3.6%) 37,200 (8.1%) 46,500 (9.5%)
Other production occupations
Of which:
61,800 (15.7%) 60,400 (14.7%) 82,000 (17.9%) 91,000 (18.7%)
Color coating and varnis-
hing
20,600 (5.2%) 16,200 (3.9%) 12,300 (2.7%) 11,900 (2.4%)
Technical occupations in 
quality control
19,500 (4.9%) 21,400 (5.2%) 25,400 (5.5%) 26,100 (5.4%)
Automation-related occupa-
tions: technical staff in mainte-
nance, mechatronics, automa-
tion and control technologies
19,000 (4.8%) 19,200 (4.6%) 39,100 (8.5%) 43,400 (9.0%)
Supervisors in production 11,200 (2.8%) 11,400 (2.8%) 19,200 (4.1%) 19,000 (3.9%)
Source: Author based on BA. Major revisions of statistical classifications that limit the comparability 
of data are marked with bold lines.
• The metalworking occupations do not show a clear trend. However, there are cle-
ar shifts between different subgroups. The share of occupations in metalworking, 
welding and toolmaking is decreasing. At the same time, the proportion of machine 
and plant operators is increasing significantly. This could be related to technical 
changes, such as the automation of the remaining manual welding work or the 
insertion activities in car body construction. It could be also partly due to changes 
in the companies’ reporting practices. There is a shift towards broader occupati-
ons (such as the mechatronics technicians) that are used across different company 
areas—it is possible that workers who were previously categorized in metalwor-
king occupations (e.g., welders) are now classified as plant operators.
• The occupations in the field of maintenance/automation/mechatronics technology 
account for a higher share of employment than is the case in the United States and 
Japan. Throughout the entire period under consideration here, the share of these 
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automation-related occupations in the German automotive industry has increased. 
An explanation could be the increasing complexity of process technologies in the 
automotive industry, which German companies are responding to by modernizing 
occupational profiles and increasing manpower (Krzywdzinski 2020; Kuhlmann 
2004).
The changing composition of the production workforce presented here applies equally 
to car manufacturers and car suppliers but at different levels (see Table 5). Assembly 
workers account for a significantly higher proportion of the production workforce at 
car manufacturers than at automotive suppliers, while the opposite is true for the me-
talworking occupations. This is due to the fact that central metalworking processes 
(casting, mechanical processing of parts and components, welding of parts and com-
ponents) are carried out by suppliers rather than by the car manufacturers themselves. 
The metalworking processes at the automobile manufacturers (stamping, welding of 
the car body) have been highly automated for a long time, with the result that the as-
sembly areas have a much larger share in terms of employment.
Table 5: Occupational composition of production workers in the German automotive 
industry in 2018
Manufacturing of mo-
tor vehicles and en-
gines (WZ2008 291)
Manufacturing of vehi-
cle bodies and trailers 
(WZ2008 292)
Manufacturing of motor 
vehicle parts and com-
ponents (WZ2008 293)
Total 232,500 (100%) 26,900 (100%) 228,100 (100%)
Assembly-related 
occupations
99,800 (42.9%) 10,000 (37.4%) 59,600 (26.1%)
Metal occupations 50,600 (21.8%) 9,800 (36.4%) 100,800 (44.2%)
Other production 
occupations
42,200 (18.1%) 4,300 (16.0%) 44,500 (19.5%)
Automation-rela-
ted occupations
28,700 (12.4%) 1,400 (5.2%) 13,300 (5.8%)
Supervisors in 
production
10,500 (4.5%) 900 (3.2%) 7,700 (3.2%)
Source: Author based on BA.
As we explained above, the occupational composition does not provide any precise 
information about the share of skilled and semi-skilled workers. For the 1990s, there 
are case studies of German automobile factories (Schumann et al. 1994; Kuhlmann 
2004) that provide information on the employment structures in the assembly areas 
and body shops. In the 1990s, automation had changed the structures in car body ma-
nufacturing significantly. At the beginning of the 1990s, 60–70% of the production 
workforce in car body shops performed manual work on the product (welding, surface 
treatment etc.); about 20–30% of the workforce consisted of semi-skilled machine 
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operators and inserters and a maximum of 10% of the workforce was skilled workers 
operating automated equipment. In 2000, the workforce of modern body shops con-
sisted of about 30% automated equipment operators (skilled workers), about 40–50% 
(often semi-skilled) machine operators and inserters, and 20–30% manual workers on 
the product (e.g., surface treatment and rework with a relatively high share of skilled 
workers) (Kuhlmann 2004: 245).
In assembly areas, at the end of the 1990s, up to 10% of the production workforce was 
skilled workers (mainly operators of automated equipment), about 25–40% upper-level 
semi-skilled workers (mainly machine operators and workers with more complex manu-
al tasks), and about 25–40% lower-level semi-skilled workers (Kuhlmann 2004: 178).
Because automation levels in the body shop and in assembly only changed gradually, 
the associated structures have likely only changed at a slow pace. A slight increase 
in the proportion of skilled workers and a slight decrease in semi-skilled workers 
would be expected—due to the increasing complexity of the technologies and car 
manufacturers’ recruitment practices. After all, these companies are attractive em-
ployers and can recruit workers with vocational training, even for jobs that do not 
necessarily require vocational training.
How can we summarize the findings of this section? In principle, there is little evidence 
in the employment data for the automotive industry since the 1990s that technological 
change has prompted an automation of manual activities in assembly. Assembly employ-
ment (along with, incidentally, logistics employment) has been astonishingly stable.
On the other hand, a slow decrease in manufacturing employment is evident in the 
occupations typical of highly automated areas, such as machine operation but also 
welding. This could be explained by the automation of the few remaining manual acti-
vities (e.g., the replacement of manual parts insertion by material handling robots), or 
by the increasing efficiency of digital process control techniques, which allow a smal-
ler number of workers to operate ever bigger and more complex production processes.
6. Conclusions
The present study leads to a number of conclusions. Firstly, it should be emphasized 
that technological change in the automotive industry should not primarily be unders-
tood as entailing an increase in automation. From the 1990s to the 2010s, the auto-
mation levels in press shops, body shops, and mechanical processing remained stable 
and very high (often close to full automation)—at least if we disregard the latecomers 
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to automation, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises. The major de-
velopments have been an ever-increasing complexity of technology, the combination 
of different materials, higher precision, and greater flexibility. In assembly processes, 
on the other hand, automation has remained relatively limited since the 1990s. These 
differences between assembly and body construction reflect the material and technical 
characteristics of the respective production processes.
This suggests that robot density indicator, which is currently very popular in research, 
should be treated with much more caution and circumspection—its value as an indica-
tor of automation seems questionable. Since the 1990s, robot density in the automotive 
industry has tripled, but the levels of automation have remained largely the same.
The fixation on robots may also prompt us to overlook the fact that changes in employ-
ment structures has been driven less by production automation than by digitalization 
in the indirect areas of development, construction, or even planning. On the one hand, 
the use of digital tools has enormously reduced the effort required for calculations, 
simulations, and data exchange. At the same time, however, this has been more than 
compensated for by the rapidly increasing complexity of development and planning 
processes due to increasing model diversity, shorter model cycles, increasing compo-
nent diversity, growing demands regarding safety and quality, and the globalization 
and fragmentation of logistics chains. These developments would not have been pos-
sible without digitalization. In recent years, electromobility and autonomous driving 
have added to the expansion of companies’ development capacities. Knowledge work 
is gaining more and more importance in the automotive industry.
The historical analysis allows for some general considerations on the future of auto-
mation and digitalization.
• It shows that deriving automation potentials at the level of individual professi-
ons or tasks (e.g. Frey/Osborne 2013; Dengler/Matthes 2018) is only of limited 
use. Rather, the material and technical conditions of automation must be conside-
red at the level of entire manufacturing processes. Individual assembly activities 
are surely highly routine, which is why Frey and Osborne (2013) expect a 98% 
probability that assembly workers will be threatened by automation. However, an 
examination of the assembly processes in the automotive industry shows that the 
diversity of individual activities as well as of part and model variants, the fluctua-
tions in production volumes and product mix, and a manufacturing environment in 
which robots can only move with difficulty (e.g. the interior of the car) have so far 
provided very difficult conditions for assembly automation.
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• The analysis of automation processes must also take into account the evolution of 
product architectures. This point has only been briefly addressed in the analysis 
presented here because there were no radical changes in product architectures in 
automotive engineering over the last two decades. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that product architectures influence the ability to automate. To stay with the 
example of assembly, the shift from internal combustion engines to electric mo-
tors, for example, reduces the complexity of the automobile powertrain - this could 
facilitate the automation of assembly steps in the engine compartment.
• In addition, the products themselves are subject to major change. The abstract esti-
mation of automation potentials at the level of occupations or tasks (Frey/Osborne 
2013; Dengler/Matthes 2018) is based on a static model which ignores product 
changes. In the case of the automotive industry, the increasing demands on the 
quality and safety of cars drove the digitalization of processes and the develop-
ment of new manufacturing technologies; the pressure to reduce vehicle weight 
due to rising environmental standards led to the use of new materials and in turn 
changed manufacturing processes; innovations in the area of drive technologies 
and the steps towards autonomous driving added even more complexity to the 
products. These developments have enormously increased the requirements in the 
field of product development and production planning, and digitalization has often 
meant providing the tools to cope with these new requirements. Certainly, some 
calculation and simulation processes have been automated - but at the same time 
the complexity of development and planning has increased so much that employ-
ment expanded considerably.
The second important conclusion of this study concerns the differences in the automa-
tion and digitalization approaches of the German, Japanese, and American automotive 
industries. The diversity of corporate strategies is often overlooked in the current di-
scussion, which often assumes a universal and global trend of automation and digita-
lization. The industries in the three countries under study have exhibited different un-
derstandings and assessments of the performance, costs, and advantages of automation 
technologies. The German automotive industry has maintained its focus on high-tech 
automation and is driving technological developments in car body construction (such 
as laser technology, the use of new materials such as aluminum); it has persisted with 
its efforts to automate assembly (even if they have so far borne relatively little fruit); 
and it is one of the pioneers of the “Digital Factory.” Japanese companies have been 
somewhat more skeptical about technology and have attached great importance to the 
flexibility and the ability to control complexity in production. American companies, 
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on the other hand, seem to be treating investment in manufacturing technology as of 
relatively subordinate importance at present. They went through a massive crisis in 
2009 and have had to focus their resources particularly strongly on innovation topics 
such as electric mobility and autonomous driving. However, the weakness of U.S. 
carmakers in terms of organizational innovation could also play a role, which authors 
such as Helper and Henderson (2014) have attributed to rigid organizational structures 
and the lack of trust between actors within the companies (labor and management) and 
in industry (automobile manufacturers and suppliers).
This conclusion also leads to a general reflection on the future of automation and di-
gitalization. It illustrates that there is a variety of development paths and that it is still 
open to what extent the path of an offensive digitalization and automation will prove 
successful at all. The pioneering role of the German automotive industry could be an 
advantage or could prove to be expensive overengineering - not for the first time, by 
the way (Jürgens/Naschold 1994).
To what extent can the effects of the respective automation and digitalization approa-
ches on employment structures be identified? In principle, caution is advisable at this 
point because the descriptive approach of the analysis pursued here does not allow 
causal relationships to be identified.
The third major conclusion of this study is that in all three countries, employment 
in manual assembly activities has been surprisingly stable. There is little sign of a 
decrease in assembly employment. Over a long period of time, there is evidence of a 
decreasing share of employment in the occupations used in highly automated areas—
typically in machine operation, but also in welding and painting activities. This may 
partly be the result of the automation of insertion activities by material handling ro-
bots. It also appears that increasing digitalization is enabling greater efficiency in the 
control, operation and maintenance of equipment.
It is evident that the investments in the digitalization of product development and 
planning, which can be considered collectively under the heading “digital factory,” 
have not been accompanied by a reduction in employment in engineering areas. On the 
contrary, especially in the case of the German automotive industry, which has invested 
particularly heavily in the digital factory, a massive increase in employment in engi-
neering and computer-related occupations has been evident. Certainly, the increasing 
importance of electric mobility and autonomous driving technologies are doing their 
part to support growth in the employment of engineers and computer scientists.
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As a fourth conclusion, it is important to emphasize the different employment dyna-
mics in Germany, the United States, and Japan, which might reflect the differences in 
automation and digitalization approaches, but also different work models.
The German automotive industry is undergoing a long-term change: The share of 
blue-collar workers in total employment is declining; within the production workforce 
there is a shift towards higher shares of skilled workers; and the share of engineers 
and computer scientists is rising sharply. This can be seen as a continuation of the 
professionalization strategies that the German automotive industry has already used to 
respond to technological change in recent decades. The Japanese automotive industry 
has exhibited a similar, albeit somewhat slower, trend. By contrast, the employment 
structures in the American automotive industry appear to be frozen and the share of 
engineers and computer scientists is strikingly low, at least in comparison with Ger-
many and Japan.
Some of these differences could be explained by the limitations of the statistics used 
here. For example, American companies have globalized their product development 
activities much more than their German and Japanese competitors. This explains a 
part of the differences between countries in the number of engineers. It is also quite 
probable that the changes in employment structures in the German automotive indus-
try is not just due to technology or automation, but is linked to the massive relocation 
processes of production from Germany, especially to Central Eastern Europe (Jürgens/
Krzywdzinski 2009, 2010)—yet, there is also no systematic comparison between the 
three countries studied in this instance, so it is not possible at this point to estimate 
the relative significance of the technical changes and the relocation of production. It 
is noteworthy, however, that in the case of the Japanese automotive industry, which 
has experienced much less relocation of production abroad, a change in employment 
structures comparable to Germany can also be observed (albeit a slower one). It should 
also be emphasized that the American industry has seen a marked shift of production to 
low-wage locations (in this case to Mexico), but the occupational composition of the 
workforce in the American automotive industry has remained remarkably stable. The-
se developments could suggest that automation and digitalization approaches could be 
a driver of the employment changes described here, independently of the geographic 
restructuring of production networks.
The differences between the countries beg the question of which conclusions can be 
drawn with regard to the future competitiveness of the three countries examined here. 
The changes in employment structures in the German automotive industry point to 
an attempt on the part of the industry to build up its own competences with regard to 
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digitalization and automation; by contrast, in the American automotive industry, the 
strategy of buying digitalization competences from external companies is emerging. 
This contradicts a thesis that has often been voiced in the public debate, namely that 
German industry is lagging behind its competitors in America and Asia with regard to 
digitalization.
However, the danger of over-engineering must be pointed out again. Moreover, the 
future of the automotive industry will not depend solely on automation and digitaliza-
tion approaches. The development of future-proof products, i.e. sustainable vehicles 
adapted to modern mobility concepts, will be decisive. In the near future, this will not 
only mean a change towards electric mobility and autonomous driving, but also chan-
ges in the importance of individual ownership of vehicles. These are major strategic 
challenges that automotive companies must face.
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8. Appendix: Additional 
Information on the Data Sources
Press Articles
The first major data source for the analysis is articles from the German industry jour-
nal Automobil Produktion. The analysis included all articles since 1992 that dealt with 
developments in automation and process technology as a core topic. A total of 393 
articles were identified. In addition, the research involved searching for articles on the 
online platforms Automation World and Automotive Manufacturing Solutions using 
the keywords “automation” and the names of the American car manufacturers. The 
search resulted in 20 articles in Automation World and 21 in Automotive Manufactu-
ring Solutions that dealt mainly with automation strategies. Japanese magazines and 
online platforms could not be researched due to the language barrier. As an alternative, 
a general online search was carried out for general reports on developments at the 
Japanese flagship manufacturer Toyota. In the end, five articles that offered compre-
hensive background reports were identified. The 439 articles found were each briefly 
summarized with regard to the most important keywords and statements. The contents 
were then evaluated according to organizational areas (assembly, body shop, press 
shop, paint shop, indirect areas), technology, and countries.
Statistics of the International Federation of Robotics
For Germany and Japan, the required information could be obtained directly from the 
IFR database. In the case of the USA, the data before 2016 had to be recalculated. The 
reason for this is that the IFR database does not show the stock of industrial robots for 
the USA until 2004, and the data up to and including 2015 is incorrect and much too 
low.80 The U.S. robot figures have been recalculated using the IFR’s estimates of robot 
density in the US automotive industry, which the IFR reports in its print publications.
80 The stock of industrial robots is calculated by the IFR based on information on new installations. 
When making this calculation, the IFR assumes a robot lifespan of 12 years. Because the IFR da-
tabase only began providing information on new installations of robots in the United States from 
2004 onwards, the information on robot stocks only meets the standard from 2016. The information 
on robot stocks for 2004 are, conversely, identical to the number of new installations for the year 
2004; the total number of robots for 2004 equals the sum of new installations for 2004 and 2005, etc. 
This implies that the stock of industrial robots before 2004 was zero, which is, of course, entirely 
false. We informed the IFR statistics department of this error but have not received any substantive 
response in this regard. 
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With regard to the data for Japan, it should be noted that the definition of industrial 
robots was only harmonized between the IFR and the Japanese Robot Association 
(JARA) in 2000.
As a general rule, the information on robot stock is an estimate. The stock of indust-
rial robots is calculated by the IFR on the basis of new installations in the past twelve 
years—in other words, a robot’s service life of twelve years is assumed. As the IFR 
(2019: 22) itself states, the typical service life could also be higher, at around 15 years. 
In the experience of the author, however, the IFR could also be overestimating the 
service life of industrial robots, at least in the case of the automotive industry, since it 
is not uncommon for car manufacturers to replace production equipment when chan-
ging product generations—and a product generation is typically in production for well 
below 12 years.
Employment Statistics
A basic problem of the statistics used here is the changes in the underlying classifica-
tion systems. These are explained in more detail here.
For the United States, data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) of 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are used. Since the 1990s, there have been a 
number of changes in the underlying classification systems of the OES. With regard 
to occupational statistics, a major revision took place in 1999 when the Standard Oc-
cupational Classification (SOC) was introduced. In 2010, the revised SOC 2010 was 
introduced, but for 90% of all occupations and for the occupational categories relevant 
to this paper, the only revisions that were made were editorial in nature and did not 
substantially change the occupational content (BLS 2010). With regard to the industry 
coding system, a major revision took place in 2002. Prior to 2002, the Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC) was used; in 2002, there was a switch to the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS), which was accompanied by substantial chan-
ges in the classification of establishments. This paper uses data from 1999 onwards, 
but it should be noted that in the case of the United States, the data before 2002 are not 
fully comparable with the later years.
For Japan, the Population Census of the Statistics Bureau of Japan (SBJ) is used. In the 
case of Japan, too, there were some changes in statistical concepts during the period 
under review. For occupational coding, the Japan Population Census uses the Japan 
Standard Occupational Classification (JSOC), which underwent two revisions during 
the period covered by this study, in 1997 and in 2009. While the 1997 revision was 
more editorial in character as far as the occupational groups discussed here are con-
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cerned, the 2009 revision brought about a considerable reorganization of occupations, 
resulting in a discontinuity in the data (Director General for Policy Planning (Statisti-
cal Standards) 2009). The present study has attempted to compensate for these discon-
tinuities by comparing the classifications at the level of the individual occupations, 
although the comparability of the data remains somewhat limited. The Japan Standard 
Industrial Classification (JSIC) was used for the industrial classification for the years 
1995–2015. In the period under review, the JSIC was revised in 2002, 2007 and 2013, 
but this did not imply any major changes with regard to the automotive industry (Di-
rector General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) 2007 and 2013). 
The data for the case of the German automotive industry are from the Federal Employ-
ment Agency (BA). Since the 1990s, there have also been a number of changes in the 
underlying classification systems in Germany. In the case of occupational statistics, a 
fundamental change took place in 2012, from the Classification of Occupations Edi-
tion 1988 (KldB1988) to the Classification of Occupations Edition 2010 (KldB2010). 
The two classifications differ considerably in their systematics and the definition of 
individual occupations. Using the BA’s tables of equivalence, this study attempted to 
achieve the most accurate possible fit of the data by matching at the level of individual 
occupations. However, the change in the classification represents such a large break 
that it limits the comparability of the data before and after 2012.
Table A1: Industry and occupational classifications in the data sets used
Industry coding Occupational coding
USA: Occupational
Employment Statistics
1999–2001 SIC
2002–2018 NAICS
1999–2018 SOC
Japan: Population Census 1995–2015 SIC 1995–2005 JSOC
2010–2015 JSOC
(major revision)
Germany: Employment 
statistics of the Federal 
Employment Agency
1999–2008 WZ1993, WZ2003 
2008–2018 WZ2008
1999–2011 KldB1988
2013–2018 KldB2010
There were also changes in industrial classification during the period under review. In 
2003, the Classification of Economic Activities 1993 (WZ1993) was replaced by the 
Classification of Economic Activities 2003 (WZ2003); however, this was a “careful 
update” of the classifications and, in the case of the automotive industry, did not invol-
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ve any major shifts (Federal Statistical Office 2003). The Classification of Economic 
Activities 2003 (WZ2003) was in turn replaced by the Classification of Economic 
Activities 2008 (WZ2008) in 2008. In the case of the automotive industry considered 
here, the change meant that, according to WZ2003, some 74,000 of the 887,000 emp-
loyees were reallocated to other economic sectors (mainly mechanical engineering and 
plant construction) and 133,000 employees who had previously been allocated mainly 
to the manufacture of IT technology, metal production, and rubber and plastic products 
were now allocated to the automotive industry. Overall, the composition of employ-
ment in the automotive industry thus changed by about 14% (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
2010). In particular, the changeover to WZ2008 brought about a shift that somewhat 
limits the comparability of the data.
